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THE ETHICAL DILEMMA OF CAMPAIGNING
FOR JUDICIAL OFFICE: A PROPOSED
SOLUTION*
1. Introduction
Judges in the United States have been guided by formal ethical
standards since the'American Bar"Association (ABA) adopted the
Canons of Judicial Ethics (the Canons) in 1924.' The aim 'of the
drafters in adopting the Canons was to set forth the views of the
ABA "respecting those principles which should govern the personal
practice of the members of the judiciary in the" administration of
their office."
'2
Under the Canons,3 a candidate for judicial office, whether an
incumbent or a lawyer seeking judicial office for the first time,4
looked to the provisions of Canons 30 and 32 'or the appropriate
behavior expected of a candidate during a judicial campaign? Chiefly,
these Canons attempted to alleviate the tensions that arise during
* We would like to thank the Stein Institute of Law & Ethics and its Director,
Professor Joseph Perillo, for their assistance and guidance in the preparation of
this Note.
1. MODEL CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS (1924).
2. Id. Preamble.
3. The Canons of Judicial Ethics have been superseded by a new set of ethical
guidelines, but are discussed at this point to set out the foundations upon which
the present ethical standards have been built. See infra notes 12-20 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the new guidelines.
4. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 226 (1941).
Although the political activity canon of the ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics did
not expressly provide for application to incumbents as well as to other candidates,
Formal Opinion 226 did declare that the canon should apply to both. Id. The
distinction between an Informal Opinion and a Formal Opinion is that an Informal
Opinion responds to a specific inquiry raised by a particular set of facts, and a
Formal Opinion sets forth a discussion that the Standing Committtee on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility of the ABA finds is of special interest to the Bar.
ABA INFORMAL ETHICs OPINIONS Introduction at 2 (1975).
5. Canon 30 stated:
Candidacy for Office
A candidate for judicial position should not make or suffer others to
make for him, promises of conduct in office which appeal to the cupidity
or prejudices of the appointing or electing power; he should not announce
in advance his conclusions of law on disputed issues to secure class
support, and he should do nothing while a candidate to create the
impression that if chosen, he will administer his office with bias, partiality
or improper discrimination.
While holding a judicial position he should not become an active
candidate either at a party primary or at a general election for any office
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campaigns for judicial office. 6 A candidate for such office must
raise funds for his campaign yet remain free from any appearance
of impropriety or influence by those who have contributed to his
campaign.7 As a result, a candidate is often caught between the
requirements of judicial ethics and the realities of the democratic
machinery.' The Canons did not explicitly address this conflict, and
consequently, they proposed no solution. 9 As one justice stated, "[i]t
is unfortunately plain, however, that even the most ethically con-
ducted campaign involves a series of exceptions to the canons which
warp their spirit and which add nothing to the public respect for
our judicial system."' 0
By 1969, the consensus in the legal community was that the Canons
were no longer effective and were not representative of a society
other than a judicial office. If a judge should decide to become a candidate
for any office not judicial, he should resign in order that it cannot be
said that he is using the power or prestige of his judicial position to
promote his candidacy or the success of his party.
If a judge becomes a candidate for any judicial office, he should
refrain from all conduct which might tend to arouse reasonable suspicion
that he is using the power or prestige of his judicial position to promote
his candidacy or the success of his party.
He should not permit others to do anything in behalf of his candidacy
which would reasonably lead to such suspicion.
MODEL CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 30 (1935).
Canon 32 stated:
Gifts and Favors
He [a judge] should not accept any presents or favors from litigants,
or from lawyers practicing before him or from others whose interests
are likely to be submitted to him for judgment.
MODEL CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 32 (1937).
6. See generally ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal
Op. 139 (1975) ("A judge should refrain from using or appearing to use the power
or prestige of his office to promote his candidacy for office. In every particular
a judge's condupt should be above reproach.").
7. THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES TO THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 98 (1973)
(Wayne Thode was the Reporter for the Special Committee that was responsible
for drafting the Model Code of Judicial Conduct) [hereinafter cited as REPORTER'S
NOTES]; see also Armstrong, Standards of Judicial Conduct, 18 TENN. B.J. 46, 52
(1982); Scott, Ethical Conduct in a Judicial Campaign: Is Campaigning an Ethical
Activity?, 57 WASH. L. REV. 119, 135 (1981-82).
8. Anderson, Ethical Problems of Lawyers and Judges in Election Campaigns,
50 A.B.A. J. 819 (1964).
9. REPORTER'S NOTES, supra note 7, at 98. But see ABA Comm. on Professional
Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 226 (1941) ("It would also be preferable that
such contribution be made to a campaign committee rather than to the candidate
personally"). ABA Formal Opinion 226 was the only formal statement issued by
the ABA suggesting how a candidate for judicial office could comply with the
Canon's requirement against creating an appearance of partiality.
10. Anderson, supra note 8, at 823.
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that was beginning to place an increasing emphasis upon professional
responsibility." As a result, a new set of ethical guidelines, with an
emphasis on maintaining the independence and integrity of the ju-
diciary, l2 .was adopted in 1972 by the ABA as the Code of Judicial
Conduct (CJC).' 3 The guidelines and requirements set out in the
CJC are intended as minimum standards, not as maximum require-
ments. 4 The CJC has been adopted in forty-seven states and in the
District of Columbia in substantially the same form as it was adopted
by the ABA. 5
Canon 7B(2) of the CJC regulates the financing of a campaign
for judicial office. It provides:
A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office
that is filled by public election between competing candidates
should not himself solicit or accept campaign funds, or solicit
11. Finley, Remodeling the Judiciary, 5 TRIAL 11 (1969); Thode, The Devel-
opment of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 793, 795 (1972).
12. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (1972). Canon 1 states:
A Judge Should Uphold the Integrity and Independence of the Judiciary
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensible to justice in our
society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and
enforcing, and should himself observe, high standards of conduct so that
the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved. The
provisions of this Code should be construed and applied to further that
objective.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (1972); see also Note, Judges-
Standards of Judicial Conduct-In re De Saulnier-Mass.-,279 N.E.2d 296, 6
SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1113, 1121 (1972); Seymour, The Code of Judicial Conduct
from the Point of View of a Member of the Bar, 1972 UTAH L. REV. 352 (Whitney
Seymour was Vice Chairman of the Special Committee responsible for drafting the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct).
13. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972).
14. The preface to the Model Code of Judicial Conduct states in part:
[T]he accompanying text setting forth specific rules, and-the commentary,
states the standards that judges should observe. The canons and text
establish mandatory standards unless otherwise indicated. It is hoped that
all jurisdictions will adopt this Code and establish effective disciplinary
procedures for its enforcement.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Preface (1972); see also ETHICS FOR JUDGES
(Fretz ed. 1973).
15. The following states have adopted some form of the ABA Model Code of
Judicial Conduct: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mis-
souri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. For a complete discussion
of the specific treatment of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct by each state,
see infra notes 105-55 and accompanying text.
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publicly stated support, but he may establish committees of re-
ponsible persons to secure and manage the expenditure of funds
for his campaign and to obtain public statements of support for
his candidacy. Such committees are not prohibited from soliciting
campaign contributions and public support from lawyers. A can-
didate's committees may solicit funds for his campaign no earlier
than [90] days before a primary election and no later than [90]
days after the last election in which he participates during the
election year. A candidate should not use or permit the use of
campaign contributions for the private benefit of himself or mem-
bers of his family.
Commentary
Unless the candidate is required by law to file a list of his campaign
contributors, their names should not be revealed to the candidate.
[Each jurisdiction adopting this Code should prescribe a time limit
on soliciting campaign funds that is appropriate to the elective
process therein.]16
The goal of this provision is to resolve the dilemma between the
candidate's need to raise campaign funds and his need to remain
unbiased, "the greatest of all conflicts between political necessity
and judicial impartiality."" The drafters felt that by allowing the
candidate,S through his campaign committee, to solicit and accept
campaign funds, the pressures of campaigning for judicial office
would be alleviated to some degree. 9 In addition, the provision
requiring the committee to keep the list of contributors concealed
from the candidate would insulate the candidate from the appearance
of impropriety.20
This Note describes the development and application of Canon
7B(2) of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct.2' It also discusses
16. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(2) (1972).
17. REPORTER'S NOTES, supra note 7, at 98; see supra notes 6-9 and accompanying
text.
18. The Model Code of Judicial Conduct also provides. guidelines for an in-
cumbent judge who is running in a retention election or unopposed election when
his candidacy has drawn opposition. Canon 7B(3) states: "An incumbent judge
who is a candidate for retention in or re-election to office without a competing
candidate, and whose candidacy has drawn active opposition, may campaign in
response thereto and may obtain publicly stated support and campaign funds in
the manner provided in subsection B(2)." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 7B(3) (1972).
19. REPORTER'S NOTES, supra note 7, at 99.
20. Armstrong, Standards of Judicial Conduct, 18 TENN. B.J. 46, 54 (1982).
21. See infra notes 25-82 and accompanying text.
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state adoption, modification and enforcement of Canon 7B(2).2 2 This
Note then discusses the results of a survey sent to elected judges
regarding judicial campaign conduct. 3 Finally, this Note recommends
that a revision of Model Canon 7B(2) be adopted by the ABA to
respond to the concerns raised by the respondents to the survey and
to incorporate various modifications adopted by individual states in
their codes of judicial conduct. 24
II. The Scope and Application of Canon 7B(2)
Canon 7B(2) of the CJC explicitly prohibits a candidate for judicial
office from soliciting or accepting campaign funds and from soliciting
publicly stated support. 2 The focus of this Note is upon the first
two prohibitions of Canon 7B(2), solicitation and acceptance of
campaign contributions. 26 These two prohibitions raise such issues
as: (1) how a candidate for judicial office may raise funds for his
campaign while complying with Canon 7B(2), 2 7 and (2) how ethics
commissions can enforce sanctions against losing candidates, as well
as against prevailing candidates, if the provisions of the Canon have
been violated. 21 In response to these issues, various resolutions. have
been proposed by jurisdictions that have found the ABA approach
difficult to implement. 29
A. Prohibitions Against the Candidate Soliciting and Accepting
Campaign Contributions
A candidate for judicial office is expressly prohibited by Canon
7B(2) from personally soliciting and accepting campaign contributions
22. See infra notes 83-190 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 191-279 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 280-302 and accompanying text.
25. For the full text of Canon 7B(2), see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
The discussion herein is based upon the Model Code of Judicial Conduct's Canon
7B(2), as adopted by the ABA. The ABA version is used as a model, with reference
to the individual treatment of Canon 7B(2) by the various states as examples of
its scope and application. For a discussion of Canon 7B(2) as adopted in each
state, see infra Section III.
26. For a discussion of these prohibitions, see infra notes 30-43 and accom-
panying text.
27. For a discussion of acceptable behavior permitted while the candidate is
raising funds for a campaign, see infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
28. For a discussion of the ability of ethics commissions to enforce Canon
7B(2), see infra notes 174-90 and accompanying text.
29. For a discussion of these resolutions, see infra notes 69-82 and accompanying
text.
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for his campaign. 0 The purpose of such a provision is to "insulate
the judge [or candidate] from suspicion of partiality were he to
directly request and receive funds from lawyers, persons likely to
be involved as plaintiffs and defendants in court proceedings, and
political organizations." 3' These proscriptions, because of the delicate
nature of the conflict involved,32 have been the focus of many ethics
committee opinions and bar association guidelines.33 While most of
these opinions and guidelines reiterate the prohibitions found in
Canon 7B(2) of the CJC,34 some committees have elaborated by
providing definitions and examples of the scope and applicability
of Canon 7B(2).3 5 For example, one bar association prohibits the
candidate's campaign committee from accepting a contribution from
an attorney, if that committee has knowledge that the contributor
has cases pending before the candidate. 6 That same guideline, how-
30. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(2) (1972).
31. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA JUDICIAL INQUIRY BOARD, GUIDELINES TO
ETHICAL CONDUCT IN JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS (1979), reprinted in AMERICAN JUDI-
CATURE SOCIETY, RESOURCE MATERIAL ON JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN CONDUCT (1980)
available in Fordham Urban Law Journal Office [hereinafter cited as AJS RESOURCE
MATERIAL].
32. See supra notes 6 and 7 and accompanying text for a discussion of this
conflict.
33. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op.
226 (1941) (predecessor to the MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(2));
SAN MATEO COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION, ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS
(1976), reprinted in AJS RESOURCE MATERIAL, supra note 31, at 1; SANTA CLARA
COUNTY FAIR JUDICIAL ELECTION PRACTICES COMM., GUIDELINES FOR JUDICIAL CAN-
DIDATES, reprinted in AJS RESOURCE MATERIAL, supra note 31, at 3; 1973 Fla Ops.
17, 73-15 (1973); BAR ASS'N OF GREATER CLEVELAND, CAMPAIGN GUIDELINES (1975),
reprinted in AJS RESOURCE MATERIAL, supra note 31, at 4; Oregon DESK BOOK
Op. 213 (1972); COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA JUDICIAL INQUIRY AND REVIEW
BOARD, GUIDELINES TO ETHICAL CONDUCT IN JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS (1979), reprinted
in AJS RESOURCE MATERIAL, supra note 31, at 2. But see Guidelines for Judicial
Campaign Conduct in San Francisco, 5 BRIEF/CASE 12 (1979) (candidate may not
solicit contributions, but is permitted to accept contributions).
34. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA JUDGES ASS'N, SUGGESTED GUIDELINES, reprinted in
AJS RESOURCE MATERIAL, supra note 31, at 3 ("[s]olicitation and collection of
funds for campaigns should be handled by representatives or committees for the
candidates rather than by the candidates themselves"); Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania Judicial Inquiry and Review Board, Guidelines to Ethical Conduct in
Judicial Campaigns, reprinted in AJS RESOURCE MATERIAL, supra note 31, at 2
("proscribes solicitation and acceptance of funds personally by candidates").
35. See, e.g., New York State Bar Ass'n Formal Op. 289 (1973), modified on
other grounds, New York State Bar Ass'n Formal Op. 558 (1984); What are
the boundaries of proper judicial campaign conduct?, 6 JUD. CONDUCT REP. 3
(1984) (citing Ky. Jud. Ethics Comm. Op. JE-42). See infra notes 36-38 and
accompanying text.
36. New York State Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 289, at 2 (1973), modified on other
grounds, New York State Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 558 (1984).
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ever, would allow the committee to solicit contributions from lawyers
who may, from time to time, appear before the candidate. 7 Another
ethics committee has defined the word "solicitation" broadly to
encompass "any request for contributions, including a person-to-
person appeal as well as a public advertisement." 3
It follows from these opinions, guidelines and the CJC, that to
remain in full compliance with Canon 7B(2), a candidate for judicial
office may not attend a fund raising event held on his behalf if he
has been involved in any way with the planning of the event.3 9
However, in order to determine what will or will not be accepted
as appropriate behavior during an election campaign, one must look
to the particular facts and circumstances of the specific situation at
issue.40 For example, if the candidate assists in compiling a list of
guests to attend a fund raiser for the purposes of securing contri-
butions for his campaign, or he is personally in contact with potential
contributors, either by mail or by phone, such activity will be deemed
solicitation and the candidate will be in violation of Canon 7B(2)
of the CJC.4 ' Such an ethical violation could result in a written
public reprimand of the candidate, 42 and furthermore, the candidate
could be required to reimburse the state for the costs of the pro-
ceedings brought against him. 43
B. The Campaign Committee
In order to achieve a system where a candidate for judicial office
is not subject to the political pressures of campaigning, the CJC
37. Id.
38. Goldstein, What are the boundaries of proper judicial campaign conduct?,
6 JuD. CONDUCT REP. 3 (1984) (citing Ky. Jud. Ethics Comm., Op. JE-42).
39. Georgia Judicial Qualifications Comm'n, Op. No. 22 (1978), reprinted in
AJS RESOURCE MATERIAL, supra note 31, at 1; see Schotland, Elective Judges'
Campaign Financing: Are State Judges' Robes the Emperor's Clothes of American
Democracy?, 1 I J. L. & POL. 57, 114 (1985) (attendance at testimonials permissible,
attendance at fund raisers not permissible) [hereinafter cited as Emperor's Clothes].
40. ABA Formal Opinion 226 states: "[l]t clearly appears that the answers to
the questions propounded [regarding permissible campaign behavior] depend pri-
marily upon the facts of each particular case." ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics
and Grievances, Formal Op. 226 (1941).
41. See, e.g., In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 402 So. 2d 1144, 1146 (Fla.
1982); Nicholson v. State Comm'n on Jud. Conduct, 50 N.Y.2d 597, 614-15, 409
N.E.2d 818, 826-27, 431 N.Y.S.2d 340, 349 (1980) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting in
part); Georgia Judicial Qualifications Comm'n Op., No. 22 (1978), reprinted in
AJS RESOURCE MATERIAL, supra note 31, at 1; Goldstein, What are the boundaries
of proper judicial campaign conduct?, 6 JUD. CONDUCT REP. 3 (1984).
42. In re Hotchkiss, 415 Mich. 1101, 327 N.W.2d 312 (1982) (direct personal
solicitation of campaign contribution resulted in published reprimand).
43. In re Inquiry Concerning A Judge, 402 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 1981) (direct
19861
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provides that while a candidate himself is forbidden from soliciting
and accepting campaign contributions," he is allowed to set up a
committee of "responsible persons" to solicit and manage the can-
didate's campaign funds. 45 To avoid any appearance of partiality,
the committee, not the candidate, is required to solicit and collect
all of the contributions. 46 To the extent permissible by law, the
committee should not reveal to the candidate the names of the
contributors to the candidate. 47
Requiring the candidate for judicial office to establish a committee
to solicit and manage his campaign funds effectively bars him from
attending a fund raiser, or similar event, on his own behalf where
any part of the price of admission will be donated to his campaign.
If the candidate were present at such a function, he would discover
the identities of many, if not all, of the contributors to his campaign
and thereby defeat the purpose of the prohibition. 4s By contrast, a
candidate for judicial office is not prohibited from soliciting or
accepting campaign contributions from the immediate members of
his family; he may accept these contributions without the buffer of
a campaign committee. 49
In addition to the requirements and prohibitions of Canon 7B(2),
solicitation of election support resulted in public reprimand and order to pay $3,000
to the state of Florida in partial reimbursement for the costs of the proceedings).
44. For a discussion of these prohibitions, see supra notes 30-38 and accom-
panying text.
45. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(2) (1972); see supra note 16
and accompanying text.
46. REPORTER'S NOTES, supra note 7, at 99; See, e.g., Michigan, Formal Op.
387 (1980) (requires committee); Michigan, Informal Op. 509 (1980) (same); Oregon
DESK BOOK, Op. 213 (1972) (same); COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA JUDICIAL
INQUIRY AND REVIEW BOARD, GUIDELINES TO ETHICAL CONDUCT IN JUDICIAL CAM-
PAIGNS (1979), reprinted in AJS RESOURCE MATERIAL, supra note 31, at 1 (same);
see also Fortson v. Weeks, 232 Ga. 472, 479, 23 S.E.2d 68, 74 (1974) (declaring
requirement for campaign committee constitutional).
47. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Commentary to Canon 7B(2) (1972).
48. Whether this prohibition reflects the true state of judicial campaigns as they
are presently run is the focus of the survey conducted by the authors. For a
complete analysis of the results, see infra Section IV.
49. BAR ASS'N OF GREATER CLEVELAND, CAMPAIGN GUIDELINES (1974), reprinted
in AJS RESOURCE MATERIAL, supra note 31, at 4; New York State Bar Ass'n,
Formal Op. 289 (1973), modified on other grounds, New York State Bar Ass'n,
Formal Op. 558 (1984); SAN MATEO COUNTY BAR ASS'N, ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR
JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS (1976), reprinted in AJS RESOURCE MATERIAL, supra note 31,
at 2. The successful candidate is protected from any appearance of impropriety by
the Code of Judicial Conduct, which requires the judge to disqualify himself should
any of the immediate members of his or her spouse's family appear before him.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C(l)(d) (1972).
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several ethics opinions address the issue of what should be done
with any excess contributions which remain after the costs of the
election have been fully paid.50 For example, Michigan requires a
candidate to refund the contributions to the donors or to contribute
the funds to the Client Security Fund of the Michigan State Bar.,,
The candidate may not contribute the excess to a charitable orga-
nization of his choice.12 In Missouri, a judge is required to return
any excess funds to the contributors on a pro rata basis.53 Presumably,
the judge is required to return the funds through his campaign
committee, since compliance with Canon 7B(2) requires the judge's
campaign committee not only to retain the names of the contributors
after the election, but also to continue to conceal them from the
judge.54
C. Application of Canon 7B(2) to Candidates and Incumbents
The CJC requires all "judges" to comply with its provisions, with
limited exceptions for part-time, pro tempore and retired judges. 5
Canon 7 is the only Canon that extends its compliance requirements
beyond the scope of "judges," as defined by the CJC, 56 by requiring
that "a candidate, including an incumbent judge, running for judicial
office" comply with the provisions stated therein.5 7 Compliance with
Canon 7B(2) is mandated by the ABA Model Code of Professional
50. Michigan Bar Ass'n, Informal Ops. 664 (1981) and 1040 (1984); Missouri
Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 18 (1979), reprinted in AJS RESOURCE MATERIAL, supra
note 31, at 1;
51. Michigan Bar Ass'n, Informal Op. 664 (1981); Michigan Bar Ass'n, Informal
Op. 1040 (1984); accord, In re Lawrence, 417 Mich. 248, 335 N.W.2d 456 (1983).
52. Michigan Bar Ass'n, Informal Op, 664 (1981).
53. Missouri Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 18 (1979), reprinted in AJS RESOURCE
MATERIAL, supra note 31, at 1.
54. Obviously, the appearance of partiality is no longer an issue applicable to
a candidate who has waged an unsuccessful campaign.
55. The Compliance provision of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct states
that:
Anyone, whether or not a lawyer, who is an officer of a judicial system
performing judicial functions, including an officer such as a referee in
bankruptcy, special master, court commissioner, or magistrate, is a judge
for the purpose of this Code. All judges should comply with this Code. ...
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Compliance provision (1972). Subdivisions (A),
(B) and (C) of the Compliance provision make limited exceptions for the Model
Code of Judicial Conduct's application to a "Part-Time Judge," a "Judge Pro
Tempore" and a "Retired Judge," respectively, as they are defined in that provision.
Id.
56. See supra note 55.
57. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(2) (1972).
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Responsibility58 and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.5 9
Ethics opinions and guidelines are also in accord with the model
provisions, requiring candidates for judicial office, including incum-
bents, to comply with Canon 7B(2). 60 A major concern voiced by
many judges is whether Canon 7B(2) is enforceable against an un-
successful candidate in a judicial election. 6 1 This issue has been
resolved to a great degree by the codes and rules that require a
lawyer running for judicial office to comply with Canon 7B(2) of
the CJC.62 The fear that a commission policing judicial conduct 63
will not have jurisdiction over an unsuccessful candidate for judicial
office is alleviated by the provisions stated in the ABA Model Code
of Professional Responsibility or the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. 61 The appropriate bar association will have jurisdiction
over the losing candidate, presuming the candidate is an attorney,
in the event that a judicial conduct commission does not. 65 Addi-
tionally, public opinion will be an active incentive to the candidate
58. Disciplinary Rule 8-103 states: "(A) A lawyer who is a candidate for judicial
office shall comply with the applicable provisions of Canon 7 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 8-103 (1979).
59. Rule 8.2(b) states: "A lawyer who is a candidate for judicial office shall
comply with the applicable provisions of the code of judicial conduct." MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.2(b) (1983).
60. See, e.g., Los ANGELES COUNTY BAR ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR THE CONDUCT
OF CAMPAIGNS FOR JUDICIAL OFFICE (1983), reprinted in AJS RESOURCE MATERIAL,
supra note 31, at 1 (applies to both primary and general elections); SAN DIEGO
COUNTY BAR ASs'N, ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS (1978), reprinted
in AJS RESOURCE MATERIAL, supra note 31, at I (same); SAN MATEO COUNTY BAR
Ass'N, ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS (1976), reprinted in AJS
RESOURCE MATERIAL, supra note 31, at I (same); New York State Bar Ass'n,
Formal Op. 289 (1973), modified on other grounds, New York State Bar Ass'n,
Formal Op. 558 (1984) (same).
61. See infra notes 261-67 and accompanying text for a complete discussion of
this concern raised by many of the respondents to the survey conducted by the
authors; see also Brooks, Campaigning for Judicial Office: A Review of the Ethical
Constraints 139 (1985) (unpublished lecture, available at the Fordham Urban Law
Journal Office).
62. For a discussion of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct and their application to lawyers running for judicial
office, see supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text; see also Gary, Ethical Conduct
in a Judicial Campaign: Is Campaigning an Ethical Activity?, 57 WASH. L. REV.
119, 133 (1981-1982).
63. See infra notes 156-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
jurisdiction and authority of these commissions in each state.
64. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text; see also G. HAZARD & W.
HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT 554 (1985).
65. G. HAZARD & W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 554 (1985). The appropriate bar association
[Vol. XIV
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to remain within the permissible bounds of the campaign financing
provisions of the CJC. 66 The drafters of the CJC suggested that
"[tihe very threat of a public statement that a candidate for judicial
office is violating Canon 7 may induce the candidate to comply. '67
However, it is the belief of many incumbent judges that this issue
has been resolved in theory only and that, in reality, losing candidates
are not bound by Canon 7B(2). 68
D. Variations on a Theme-Attempts to Amend Canon 7B(2)
The costs of campaigning for judicial office have reached exor-
bitant heights. 69 Unless a candidate is capable of financing his cam-
paign from personal funds, it is virtually impossible for him to run
for judicial office without seeking financial support from his con-
stituency. It is unrealistic to presume that a candidate will not
personally solicit or accept campaign contributions and will not learn
the names of his contributors. 70 California has responded by sus-
pending Canon 7B entirely from its Code of Judicial Conduct. 7'
Other jurisidictions have attempted to enact variations of Canon
7B(2) which take into account both the candidate's need to raise
substantial funds for a campaign, as well as the countervailing aims
of remaining impartial and independent. 72
The Detroit Bar Association proposed the "Fair Plan," which
only will have jurisdiction over candidates who are lawyers. This does not include
lay magistrates. Id.
66. REPORTER'S NOTES, supra note 7, at 96; Thode, The Development of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 793, 802 (1972).
67. Thode, The Development of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 9 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 793, 802 (1972).
68. See infra notes 261-267 and accompanying text for a discussion of this
concern raised by many of the judges who responded to the survey conducted by
the authors.
69. For a complete discussion of these costs, see Emperor's Clothes, supra note
39. See also N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1985, at B6, col. I ("[Ilegal researchers say judicial
campaign costs have soared recently in New York, Texas, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Alabama,
Oregon, Florida and most of the 31 other states that require judges to face voters either
for confirmation of the initial appointment or for retention on the bench").
70. See, e.g., Spaeth, Reflections on a judicial campaign, 60 JUDICATURE 11,
14 (1976) ("in general, I did not know who gave me money. . . . [S]ometimes by
accident, I learned of ccntributions by others").
71. CAL. CIV. & CRIM. CT. RULES CODE, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (West
1981) (Canon 7B suspended, 9/21/76). In California, it was determined that there
was no agency that could effectively sanction unsuccessful candidates. Emperor's
Clothes, supra note 39, at 91. Presumably, this fear of the inability to enforce
the provision arose out of violations by candidates and the states' subsequent
inability to protect the public from such violations.
72. See, e.g., Baum, Should Judges know who gave to their campaigns?, 60
JUDICATURE 258 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Detroit Plan]; Dade County Lawyers
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provided for the appointment of trustees through whom lawyers
could contribute to a judicial campaign. 7" The goal of this plan was
to keep the identity of the contributor from ever being revealed to
the candidate.7 4 The "Fair Plan" was to be a totally voluntary
system in which the contributor would be able to label the funds
he was contributing for a specific candidate, if the contributor so
desired.7" The undesignated funds would then be distributed equally
among all of the candidates. 76 In addition, the plan provided for
the imposition of a fine of five hundred dollars on the candidate
in the event of a breach of anonymity by the contributor."
Another plan, adopted by one county in Florida, similarly estab-
lished a "Trust Fund." 78 The trustees of the fund were to solicit
voluntary contributions from all practicing members of the bar in
that county.7 9 The funds donated were to be distributed pro rata
to each candidate. 0 The "Fair Plan," however, was never adopted,
and the "Trust Fund" failed soon after it was implemented.' These
unsuccessful attempts at revision of the present system illustrate the
inability of the CJC, and each respective implementing commission,
to effectively regulate and police the financing of a judicial campaign.
It is time for the adoption of a uniform proposal that will successfully
guide and regulate all candidates who run for judicial office. 2
III. State Treatment of Canon 7B(2)
Either the bar association or the highest court of most of the
fifty states, as well as the Joint Committee on Judicial Administration
in the District of Columbia, have adopted the ABA's Code of Judicial
Conduct 3 or its predecessor, 4 as modified to conform with applicable
Support Qualified Judicial Candidates, 56 JUDICATURE 218 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Dade County Plan]; see also Emperor's Clothes, supra note 39, at 96-107, for
a discussion of these and other plans.
73. Detroit Plan, supra note 72, at 258.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 259.
77. Id.
78. Dade County Plan, supra note 72, at 218.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See Emperor's Clothes, supra note 39, at 104-07.
82. For a complete discussion of the authors' proposal for a resolution of this
problem, see infra notes 280-302 and accompanying text.
83. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972).
84. MODEL CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS (1924).
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judicial procedures. s5 The choice of whether to adopt a form of
Canon 7B(2) in each of those states has depended upon both the
state's judicial selection system and the adopting body's philosophy
concerning appropriate judicial campaign conduct. 86 Enforcement
procedures have been established in most of the states that have
adopted a campaign conduct provision. 87
85. See ALA. CODE, RULES OF ALABAMA SUPREME COURT, CANONS OF JUDICIAL
ETHICS (1984 & Supp. 1985); ALASKA RULES OF COURT PROCEDURE AND ADMIN-
ISTRATION vol. II (1985); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN., SUP. CT. RULE 81 (Supp. 1985);
255 Ark. 1075 (1973-74) (per curiam) (supreme court declared that the ABA Code
of Judicial Conduct constitutes proper standards for the judiciary of the state);
CAL. CIV. & CRIM. CT. RULES CODE, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (West 1981);
COLO. REV. STAT., COURT RULES ch. 24 app., CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1973
& Supp. 1984); CONN. RULES OF COURT, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (West 1986);
DEL. CODE ANN., DEL. JUDGE'S CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1981); D.C. COURTS,
ANNUAL REPORT 8 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN., BAR & JUDICIARY RULES, CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT (West 1985); GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, 251 Ga. 897
(1984); HAWAII RULES OF COURT, THE JUDICIARY OF HAWAII, vol. 2, ex. B (1977);
IDAHO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1976) (available in Fordham Urban Law Journal
Office); IND. CODE ANN., COURT RULES (Burns Supp. 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. §
610 app., CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (West 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-176
(1981); Ky. REV. STAT., SUP. CT. RULE 4.300 (1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN., CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (West Supp. 1986); ME. RULES OF COURT, CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT (West 1985); MD. ANN. CODE, RULE 1231 (1985); MASS. RULES OF COURT,
Rule 3:09 (West 1985); MICH. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, 64 MICH. B.J. 42r
(1985); MINN. RULES OF COURT, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (West 1986); Mo.
RULES OF COURT, SUP. CT. RULE 2 (West 1986); NEB. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
(available in Fordham Urban Law Journal Office); NEV. REV. STAT., SUP. CT.
RULES (1985); N.H. COURT RULES, SUP. CT. RULE 38 (Equity 1983); RULES GOV-
ERNING THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF N.J., CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (West
1986); N.M. STAT. ANN., JUDICIAL CHAPTER 15 (1985); N.Y. JUD. LAW app.
(McKinney 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT., RULES, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1984);
N.D. COURT RULES, RULES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (West 1984); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN., CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (Page 1983); OKLA. COURT RULES & PROC.,
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (West 1985-86); OR. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1983)
(avaliable in Fordham Urban Law Journal Office); PA. RULES OF COURT, CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (West 1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS, SUP. CT. RULE 48 (1976);
S.C. CODE ANN., SUP. CT. RULE 33 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. ch. 16-2 app. (1979); TENN. CODE ANN., SUP. CT. RULE 10 (Supp.
1985); TEXAS RULES OF COURT, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (West 1984); UTAH
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (Executive director of Utah Judicial Conduct Com-
mission stated in a telephone conversation on 2/19/86 that the Utah Supreme Court
adopted the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, app. VIII,
A.O.10 (Supp. 1984); VA. CODE pt. 6, § 111 (1985); WASH. REV. CODE, RULES OF
CT., CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1983); W. VA. CODE, JUDICIAL CODE OF ETHICS
(1982); Wis. CT. RULES & PROC., SUP. CT. RULES ch. 60 (West 1985); Wyo. CT.
RULES ANN., CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (Michie 1985).
86. See infra notes 88-155 and accompanying text.
87. See infra notes 156-90 and accompanying text.
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A. State Judicial Selection Systems
Partisan popular election, nonpartisan popular election, executive
appointment, legislative election or appointment, and merit selection
constitute the five major judicial selection methods currently existing
in the United States.a Judges selected by partisan popular election
are nominated at party conventions and primary elections, and then
are elected by the people of their respective jurisdictions.8 9 At least
eighteen states have recently selected some or all of their judges by
partisan popular election. 90
In nonpartisan popular elections, a candidate's name is placed on
the ballot if he obtains enough signatures on a petition that he has
circulated. The candidate then runs without a party designation in
an election decided by the people of his jurisdiction. 9' Initial selection
of all or some judges at nonpartisan popular elections has recently
taken place in twenty states. 92
Judicial selection by executive appointment involves appointment
by the chief executive of a state, often from a list of nominees
submitted by a nominating commission, and is sometimes subject
to the approval of a confirming body. 93 The executives of at least
fourteen states and the District of Columbia appoint either all or
some of the judges in their respective jurisdictions. 94
88. See Comment, Methods of Judicial Selection and A Viable Alternative, 3-
4 SAN FERN. V.L. REV. 109, 109 (1974-75) [hereinafter cited as Methods]. Many
of the survey's respondents expressed a preference for a particular selection system.
See infra notes 242-48 and accompanying text. However, the purpose of this Note
is to examine the practicability of Canon 7B(2) and thus, it assumes the status
quo of elective systems in the United States. For treatment of the pros and cons
of various judicial selection systems, see Emperor's Clothes, supra note 39, at 81-
83; Methods, supra.
89. See, e.g., Methods, supra note 88, at 110.
90. See THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 1984-
1985, 154-55 (1984) [hereinafter cited as BoOK OF THE STATES]. The eighteen states
are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Maine,
Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and West Virginia. Id.
91. See, e.g., Methods, supra note 88, at 111.
92. See BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 90, at 154-55. The twenty states are
Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Min-
nesota, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota,
Utah, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Id.
93. See, e.g., Methods, supra note 88, at 112-13.
94. See BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 90, at 154-55. The fourteen states are
California, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah and
Vermont. Id.
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Selections by the legislature are made from nominations submitted
by the chief executive of a state or a judicial nominating com-
mission. 95 In four states, judicial selection is made in whole, or in
part, by legislative appointment or election. 96
Under merit selection, or the "Missouri Plan, ' 97 a nonpartisan
nominating commission, composed of judges, lawyers and laymen,
select several qualified judicial candidates and send a list of their
names to an appointive power, usually the chief executive or leg-
islature of the state. Once an individual has been appointed to the
bench and has served for an initial term of one to three years, he
must be approved by the voters in a nonpartisan merit retention
election in order to retain his judicial position. 98 States following
the "Missouri Plan" for the selection of some or all of their judges
number at least fourteen. 99 In addition, California follows a modified
"Missouri Plan" for the selection of some of its judges.' °° However,
one authority has suggested that California's selection method is,
in effect, one of executive appointment. 0' In Idaho, magistrates are
appointed for an initial eighteen-month period by the District Mag-
istrates Commission, and then must run for retention in the next
general election.102
In sum, there are forty-two states in which some or all of the
judicial officers must stand for election, either for initial selection
or for retention of their appointive positions.0 3 Thus, it is probable
that a vast majority of the states have, at one time or another,
95. See, e.g., Methods, supra note 88, at 113.
96. See BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 90, at 154-55. The four states are
Connecticut, Rhode Island, South Carolina and Virginia. Id.
97. Missouri was the first state to adopt a merit selection plan. Frank, His
Honor, the candidate, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1984 at 25, 27.
98. See id., at 27; Methods, supra note 88, at 114-15.
99. See BooK OF THE STATES, supra note 90, at 154-55. The fourteen states are
Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri,
Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee and Wyoming. Id.
100. Judges of the supreme court and court of appeals are approved after, rather
than nominated before, appointment by the governor, by a Commission on Judicial
Appointment. However, like candidates subject to the typical merit selection system,
those judges must subsequently stand for retention on a nonpartisan ballot at
general elections. BooK OF THE STATES, supra note 90, at 154.
101. See Methods, supra note 88, at 116 (author states that "[i]n practice, the
Commission has repeatedly approved the governor's nominations").
102. See BooK OF THE STATES, supra note 90, at 154.
103. See supra notes 90, 92, 99, 100, 102 and accompanying text for a list of
these states.
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considered the possibility of establishing judicial campaign conduct
regulations. 104
B. State Adoption and Modification of Canon 7B(2)
Canon 7B(2) has been adopted without modification in only eight
of the forty-seven states that have adopted the Code.' °5 In nine other
states, the model Canon has been modified only by an elimination
or modification of the solicitation time limit provision.' °6 Such mod-
ifications are in full accordance with the intentions of the drafters
of the CJC, who proposed that "[ejach jurisdiction adopting [the
CJC] should prescribe a time limit on soliciting campaign funds that
104. The need for adoption and enforcement of ethical campaign guidelines will
of course vary depending upon the type of judicial election. There is far less
campaigning for merit retention elections than there is for initial selection at partisan
or nonpartisan elections. See Griffin & Horan, Merit retention elections: what
influences the voters?, 63 JUDICATURE 78, 84 (1979-80); Note, Analysis of Methods
of Judicial Selection and Tenure, 6 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 955, 966 (1971-72). Fur-
thermore, even in states that. have established elective judicial selection systems,
many judges are initially appointed rather than elected, through the chief executive's
power of interim appointment. That power is enhanced by the cooperation of many
judges, who retire or resign shortly before the expiration of their terms. See H.
GLICK & K. VINES, STATE COURT SYSTEMS 42 (1973).
105. See ALASKA RULES OF COURT PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION vol. Ill
(1985); IND. CODE ANN., COURT RULES (Burns Supp. 1985); NEB. CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT (available in Fordham Urban Law Journal Office); S.C. CODE ANN.,
SUP. CT. RULE 33 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. ch. 16-
2 app. (1979); UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (Executive director of Utah
Judicial Conduct Commission stated in a telephone conversation on 2/19/86 that
the Utah Supreme Court adopted the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, app. VIII, A.O.10 (Supp. 1984); WYo. CT. RULES ANN., CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT (Michie 1985). North Dakota has adopted the model Canon
with minor modifications. See N.D. COURT RULES, RULES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
(West 1984).
106. See In re Code of Judicial Conduct, 627 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Ark. 1982) (per
curiam) ("campaign funds may be solicited and accepted on behalf of a judicial
candidate beginning 180 days prior to the first election in which he is a candidate");
MINN. RULES OF COURT, Code of Judicial Conduct (West 1986) (eliminates time
limit provision); Mo. RULES OF COURT, SUP. CT. RULE 2 (West 1986) (eliminates
time limit provision); N.Y. JUD. LAW app. (McKinney 1975) (time limit is 6 months
rather than 90 days); N.C. GEN. STAT., RULES, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1984)
(eliminates time limit provision; also eliminates prohibition against candidate so-
liciting publicly stated support); PA. RULES OF COURT, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
(West 1986) (committees may solicit funds no earlier than 30 days prior to first
day for filing nominating petitions or last day for filing declaration of intention
to seek reelection on a retention basis); R.I. GEN. LAWS, SUP. CT. RULE 48 Canon
27(c) (1976) (eliminates time limit provision); WASH. REV. CODE, RULES OF CT.,
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 7B(2) (1983) (committees may solicit funds no earlier
than 120 days from date when filing for office first permitted and no later than
30 days after last election in which candidate participates during election year);
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is appropriate to the elective process therein."' 01 Thus, approximately
one-third of the jurisdictions with elective judicial selection or re-
tention systems maintain that the ethical standards contained in
Canon 7B(2) are appropriate for judicial election campaigns. 108
The Supreme Court of Ohio has adopted a Canon 7B(2) which
incorporates all of the prohibitions contained in the model Canon,
but goes well beyond the model in establishing procedures for the
operation of campaign committees. °9 The Canon, like the CJC,
allows a committee to solicit contributions from lawyers but, unlike
the CJC, states that "[such] committee should not, directly or
indirectly, solicit or receive any . . . contribution for any political
or personal purpose whatever from any employee, appointee of the
court or anyone who does business with the court."' 0 Thus, it
appears that the committee is prohibited from soliciting and accepting
contributions from attorneys with cases pending in the candidate's
court. Although the Canon provides that "[ejach candidate for
W. VA. CODE, JUDICIAL CODE OF ETHICS Canon 7B(2) (1982) (committees may
solicit funds in accordance with state law).
107. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(2) (1972).
108. Every type of judicial election is represented by the states that have adopted
Canon 7B(2). All of the judges who are initially selected by popular election in
Arkansas, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and West
Virginia run on a partisan ballot. See BooK OF THE STATES, supra note 90, at 154-
55. Minnesota and Washington have only nonpartisan elections. Id. Georgia has
both partisan and nonpartisan elections. Id. In Alaska and Nebraska, all judicial
elections are for the retention of office. Id. While partisan and retention elections
are held in Indiana and Missouri, nonpartisan and retention elections are held in
South Dakota and Wyoming. Id. Since Canon 7B(2) applies to candidates for
judicial offices that are filled by public election between competing candidates, it
is surprising that the exact language of subsection (2) has been adopted by juris-
dictions in which all judicial elections are for the retention of office. One possible
explanation is that Canon 7B(3) provides that candidates for retention in office
may obtain campaign funds in the manner provided in subsection (2). MODEL CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(3) (1972). However, for examples of more accurate
draftmanship for merit selection systems, see infra notes 153-55 and accompanying
text. In any event, there does not appear to be any explanation for the adoption
of Canon 7B(2) in Rhode Island, where judges are either appointed by the governor
or elected by the legislature, or in Vermont, where all judges are appointed by
the governor with the advice and consent of the senate. See BooK OF THE STATES,
supra note 90, at 154-55.
109. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN., CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(2) (Page
1983).
110. Id. The candidate is also prohibited from soliciting or receiving any con-
tribution from an employee, appointee, or anyone who does business with the
court. Id. Canon 7B(3). The commentary to Canon 7B(3) provides: "Appointees
of the court include officials such as referees, commissioners, special masters,
receivers, guardians, appraisers and personnel such as clerks, secretaries, bailiffs
and all other employees and appointees." Id. Canon 7B(3) commentary.
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judicial office shall have no more than one campaign committee for
purposes of receiving contributions and making expenditures," the
commentary further provides that "[tihese restrictions shall not be
interpreted to prohibit a civic organization, bar association or duly
constituted and lawfully elected political party organization from
raising funds and making expenditures in behalf of judicial candidates
which it has decided to support.""'
According to the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct, candidates'
committees "are prohibited from soliciting campaign contributions
from lawyers in excess of $100 per lawyer.""12 The Michigan code
also modifies the time limit provision on soliciting and accepting
contributions," 3 and provides for the disposition of excess funds."
4
While Canon 7B(2) of the CJC prohibits a candidate from per-
sonally soliciting and accepting campaign funds," 5 in several states,
a candidate is prohibited only from soliciting campaign contribu-
tions." 6 The codes of some of these states, like the CJC, provide
that the candidate may establish committees to both secure and
manage the expenditure of funds for his campaign," 7 while another
simply permits the committees to secure funds for the election cam-
paign." 8 Arizona's code provides that "[a]ll candidates should refrain
I11. Id. Canon 7B(2) commentary.
112. MICH. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, 64 MICH. B.J. 42r, 45r (1985).
113. Id. (may solicit funds no earlier than 180 days before a primary election
or nominating convention and may not solicit or accept funds after date of the
general election).
114. Id.
115. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(2) (1972).
116. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN., SUP. CT. RULE 81 (Supp. 1985); FLA. STAT.
ANN., BAR & JUDICIARY RULES (West 1983) (time limitation is also modified;
committees may solicit funds only within the time limitation provided by law); GA.
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, 251 Ga. 897, 907 (1984) (time limitation is also
eliminated); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I10A, § 70 (Smith-Hurd 1985) (does not have a
code of judicial conduct, but Sup. Ct. Rule 70 governs "partisan politics"); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 20-176 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT., SUP. CT. RULE 4.300 (1983); OKLA.
COURT RULES & PROC., CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(2) (West 1985-86);
OR. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(7) (1983) (available in Fordham Urban
Law Journal Office); TENN. CODE ANN., SUP. CT. RULE 10 (Supp. 1985). However,
in one of these states, a candidate for judicial office, who solicits or accepts
contributions from any political party, is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first
degree. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 105.071 (West 1982).
117. See FLA. STAT. ANN., BAR & JUDICIARY RULES (West 1983); Ky. REV. STAT.,
SUP. CT. RULE 4.300 (1983); OKLA. COURT RULES & PROC., CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 7B(2) (West 1985-86) (such committee may solicit and manage
campaign contributions); OR. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(7) (1983)
(available in Fordham Urban Law Journal Office) (committees to secure and manage
financing and expenses); TENN. CODE ANN., SUP. CT. RULE 10 (Supp. 1985).
118. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-176 (1981).
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from personally soliciting campaign contributions [and] should refer
prospective contributors to the candidate's campaign committee."" 9
In Illinois, "[a] candidate for election to or retention in a judicial
office shall not personally solicit campaign contributions, but should
establish some method which will not involve him in the direct
solicitation of funds."' 20 In Georgia, candidates should not "be
present at a function while solicitations of campaign funds on their
behalf are conducted."'' According to the code of Nevada, a can-
didate may personally solicit, as well as accept, funds for his cam-
paign, provided he remain within the stated time limitation and does
not use or permit the use of campaign contributions for purposes
unrelated to the campaign.' 22
The supreme courts of some states have expressed greater dis-
satisfaction with Model Canon 7B(2), believing that it inadequately
addresses the pressures of political reality. For example, the code
of Alabama states that although judges and candidates for judicial
office should refrain from engaging in political activities, it is realized
that they cannot divorce themselves completely from activities related
to their own election campaigns. 23 The only prohibition from model
Canon 7B(2) incorporated into Alabama's Canons of Judicial Ethics
119. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN., SUP. CT. RULE 81 (Supp. 1985).
120. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 11OA, § 70 (Smith-Hurd 1985).
121. GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, 251 Ga. 897, 907 (1984).
122. See NEV. REV. STAT., SUP. CT. RULES (1985) (may solicit funds no earlier
than 180 days before the primary election and no later than 90 days after the last
election in which he participates).
123. The Code provides:
A judge or a candidate for election to a judicial office should endeavor
at all times to refrain from political activities inappropriate to the judicial
office that he holds or seeks. It is desirable that a judge or a candidate
for election to judicial office endeavor not to be involved in the internal
workings of political organizations, engage in campaign activities in
connection with a political candidate other than candidates for judicial
offices and not be involved in political fund solicitations other than for
himself. However, so long as judges ar6 subject to nomination and
election as candidates of a political party, it is realized that a judge or
a candidate for election to a judicial office cannot divorce himself
cdnpletely from political organizations and campaign activities which,
indirectly or directly, may be involved in his election or re-election.
Nevertheless, should a judge or a candidate for a judicial position be
directly or indirectly involved in the internal workings or campaign
activities of a political organization, it is imperative that he conduct
himself in a manner at all times to prevent any political considerations,
entanglements or influences from ever becoming involved in or from
ever appearing to be involved in any judicial decision or in the judicial
process.
ALA. CODE, RULES OF ALABAMA SUPREME COURT, CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS
Canon 7A(l) (1984).
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is that against the use of campaign contributions for the private
benefit of the candidate.'2 4
The Supreme Court of New Mexico repealed Canon 7, including
subdivision B(2), 125 in 1979 and replaced it with a provision that
allows judges to participate in the political process to the same extent
as other publicly elected officials. 26 However, the Court has adopted
a new Canon 8, effective October 1, 1985, entitled "A judge shall
refrain from campaign fund raising activity which has the appearance
of impropriety."'' 27 Under this Canon, a judge may not personally
solicit or accept funds from a litigant in a case presently pending
before him in court or accept contributions from an attorney in a
pending case. 28 In addition, no candidate for judicial office may
solicit funds from any attorney or accept any contributions which
would give the appearance of impropriety. 2 9 While, unlike the CJC,
the Canon does not prohibit candidates from personally soliciting
contributions from anyone who is not an attorney or current litigant,
or from accepting funds from anyone not involved in a case that
is pending before him, it does prohibit the types of campaign fund
raising that could most readily lead to charges of judicial partiality.
124. Id. Canon 7B(l)(d).
125. Prior to repeal, Canon 7B(2) read:
A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office that is
filled by public election between competing candidates may establish
committees of responsible persons to secure and manage the expenditure
of funds campaign [sic] and to obtain public statements of support for
his candidacy. A candidate should not use or permit the use of campaign
contributions for the private benefit of himself or members of his family.
See Ellis, Judges and Politics: Accountability and Independence in an Election Year
(Book Review), 12 N.M.L. REV. 873, 885 n.50 (1982) (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. §
16-11-7 (Supp. 1975) (repealed 1979)).
126. The Canon provides:
The New Mexico constitution provides that judges shall be elected. Judges
are obligated to participate as candidates for judicial office the same as
other publicly elected officials. The constitution does not place any special
restrictions on participation in politics by judges. Prior court rules have
severely restricted such participation. These rules are inconsistent with
the constitutional mandate that judicial offices shall be elective. Therefore,
judges may hereinafter participate in the political process to the same
extent as is provided by laws for other citizens, but only in strict
conformity with the provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct regarding
upholding the integrity and independence of the judiciary, avoiding im-
propriety, performing impartially and diligently and avoiding conflicts of
interest.
N.M. STAT. ANN., JUDICIAL CHAPTER 15 Canon 7A (1985).
127. Id. Canon 8.
128. Id. Canon 8A, D.
129. Id. Canon 8A, E.
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In Maryland and Wisconsin, the codes provide that "[a] judge
shall not accept gifts from lawyers, groups or persons whose interests
are, are likely to be, or have been before him in his official ca-
pacity." 1 30 However, both codes also provide that "[tihis rule does
not prohibit reasonable financial contributions to a voluntary cam-
paign committee in behalf of a judicial candidate."'' The Wisconsin
code further reads: "The nonpartisan elective process ... is an
expensive one and until other means of conducting and financing
judicial elections are devised, this rule should be so construed."',
California suspended its Canon 7B in 1976,11 not only for the
lack of more appropriate means of conducting and financing judicial
elections, but also for lack of an enforcement body with both the
authority and willingness to enforce the subdivision against non-
incumbents. 3 4 Mississippi regulates judicial campaign fund raising,
not by holding judicial candidates to the campaign conduct standards
set out in the CJC, but rather by imposing a contribution amount
limitation on potential contributors.'35 Reasonable contribution lim-
itations have been recognized as practical devices for allowing can-
didates for elective office to raise funds for their campaigns without
130. MD. ANN. CODE RULE 1231, JUDICIAL ETHICS RULE 7 (1985) (contributions
to be made in compliance with the laws of the state); Wis. CT. RULES & PROC.,
SUP. CT. RULES ch. 60.10 (West 1985).
131. MD. ANN. CODE RULE 1231, JUDICIAL ETHICS RULE 7 (1985); Wis. CT.
RULES & PROC., SUP. CT. RULES ch. 60.10 comment (West 1985).
132. WIs. CT. RULES & PROC., SUP. CT. RULES ch. 60.10 comment (West 1985).
133. See CAL. CIV. & CRIM. CT. RULES CODE, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (West
1981). Prior to suspension, Canon 7B(2) read:
A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office that is
filled by public election between competing candidates, should not himself
solicit campaign funds, but he may establish committees of responsible
persons to secure and manage the expenditure of funds for his campaign.
Such committees are not prohibited from soliciting campaign contributions
and public support from lawyers. A candidate's committees may solicit
funds for his campaign no earlier than such time as an announcement
of a potential candidacy against the incumbent judge has been made,
and then no later than 120 days after the last election in which he
participates during the election year. A candidate should not use or permit
the use of campaign contributions for the private benefit of himself or
members of his family.
CAL. CIv. & CRIM. CT. RULES CODE, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B
historical note (West 1981).
134. Emperor's Clothes, supra note 39, at 91. For a discussion of the enforcement
of Canon 7B(2) against non-incumbents, see infra notes 179-90 and accompanying
text.
135. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 23-3-65 (Supp. 1984). The statute provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, trustee, or corporation or any
association of persons, by whatever name known, to make a contribution,
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risking an appearance of partiality. 3 6 Thus, the approach taken by
Mississippi in regulating its judicial campaigns both avoids the problems
of code enforceability against judicial candidates and serves the dual
aims of Canon 7B(2) of the CJC.'3 7 However, this approach may
deprive a candidate of funds that he would be permitted to accept,
under Canon 7B(2), through his campaign committee. On the other
hand, it permits a candidate to personally solicit and accept contribu-
tions, conduct prohibited by the CJC.
The commentary to Canon 7B(2) of the CJC provides that "[u]nless
the candidate is required by law to file a list of his campaign
contributors, their names should not be revealed to the candidate."' 38
Only ten states have incorporated this commentary into their codes
of judicial conduct.3 9 In recent years, each of the fifty states and
the District of Columbia have enacted campaign finance disclosure
laws which require the reporting of all campaign contributions and,
with respect to individual contributions exceeding minimum amounts,
the names of contributors as well. 40 One state has also enacted a
disclosure provision that applies specifically to candidates for judicial
as the term contribution is hereinabove defined, in the aggregate in excess
of two hundred fifty dollars ($250.00) to or for any candidate at any
primary for nomination to any of the judicial offices mentioned in section
23-3-63.
Id. However, prior to its amendment in 1978, the statute made it unlawful for
anyone, except a member of the bar, to make such contributions, and the amount
of the contributions from members of the bar was limited to $50. See Miss. CODE
ANN. § 23-3-65 (1972). For a discussion of contribution amount limitations, see
infra notes 276-77 and accompanying text.
136. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1975).
137. For a discussion of the goals of Model Canon 7B(2), see supra notes 17-
20 and accompanying text.
138. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(2) commentary (1972).
139. See 255 Ark. 1075 (1973-74) (per curiam) (supreme court declared that the
ABA Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes proper standards for the judiciary of
the state); NEB. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (available in Fordham Urban Law
Journal Office); N.D. COURT RULES, RULES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (West 1984);
S.C. CODE ANN., SUP. CT. RULE 33 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. ch. 16-2 app. (1979); TENN. CODE ANN., SUP. CT. RULE 10 (Supp.
1985); UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (Executive director of Utah Judicial
Conduct Commission stated in a telephone conversation on 2/19/86 that the Utah
Supreme Court adopted the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct); WASH. REV. CODE,
RULES OF CT., CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1983); W. VA. CODE, JUDICIAL CODE
OF ETHICS (1982); Wyo. CT. RULES ANN., CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (Michie
1985).
140. See ALA. CODE § 17-22-10 (1975) ($10); ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.040 (1982)
($100); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-915 (Supp. 1985) ($25); ARK. STAT. ANN. §
3-1111 (Supp. 1985) ($250); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 84211 (West Supp. 1986) ($100);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-45-108 (1973) ($25); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-348h(a) (1983)
($30); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 8007 (1981) ($100); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1416
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office.' 4' The enactment of these laws may account for the absence
of the commentary in most states and warrant its elimination in
those states in which it has been adopted. References have been
made to the disclosure laws in a few of the state codes of judicial
conduct. 142
Seventeen states have adopted Canon 7B(3) as it is stated in the
CJC. 143 Subsection (3) provides: "An incumbent judge who is a
candidate for retention in or re-election to office without a competing
candidate, and whose candidacy has drawn active opposition, may
campaign in response thereto and may obtain publicly stated support
(Supp. 1985) ($50); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 106.07 (West 1982 & Supp. 1985) ($100);
GA. CODE ANN. § 21-5-5 (Supp. 1985) ($101); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 11-199 (Supp.
1984) ($25); IDAHO CODE § 67-6612 (1980) ($50); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, § 9-11
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) ($150); IND. CODE ANN. § 3-4-6-9 (Burns 1982) ($100);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 56.6 (West Supp. 1985) ($25); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-4148
(Supp. 1984) ($50); Ky. REV. STAT. § 121.180 (Supp. 1984) ($50); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 18:1495.4 (West 1986) (minimum amounts vary from $500 to $2,000,
depending upon office); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 1017 (1985) ($50); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 33, § 26-11 (1984) (no minimum amount); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
55, § 18 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1978) ($15); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 169.226
(West Supp. 1985) ($20); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 10A.20 (West Supp. 1985) ($100);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 23-3-41 (Supp. 1985) ($200); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 130.041 (Supp.
1986) ($100); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-37-229 (1985) ($25); NEB. REV. STAT. § 49-
1455 (1984) ($100); NEV. REV. STAT. § 294A.010 (1985) ($500); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 664:6, 664:7 (Supp. 1983) ($25); N.J. REV. STAT. § 19.44A-16 (Supp.
1985) ($100); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-19-31 (1985) (no minimum amount); N.Y.
ELEC. LAW §§ 14-102, 14-104 (McKinney 1978) ($99); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-
278.8, 163-278.11 (1982) ($100); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1-02 (Supp. 1985)
($100); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.10 (Page Supp. 1984) (no minimum amount);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 15-103 (Supp. 1985) ($200); OR. REV. STAT. § 260.083
(1985) ($50); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 3246 (Purdon Supp. 1985) ($250); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 17-25-7 (Supp. 1985) ($200); S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-620 (Law. Co-
op. 1976) ($100); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 12-25-13 (1982) ($100); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 2-10-107 (1985) ($100); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 251.011 (Vernon 1986)
($50); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-14-8 (1984) ($50); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2803
(1982) ($50); VA. CODE § 24.1-258 (1985) ($100); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17.090
(Supp. 1986) ($25); W. VA. CODE § 3-8-5a (Supp. 1985) ($250); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 11.06 (West Supp. 1985) ($20); Wyo. STAT. § 22-25-106 (Supp. 1985) (no minimum
amount).
141. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 105.08 (West 1982).
142. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN., SUP. CT. RULE 81 Canon 7B(2) (Supp. 1985) ("A
candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office, whether by a contested
election or seeking the retention of the office according to law, shall comply with
the Arizona statutes relating to the financial aspects of the candidacy."); NEV.
REV. STAT., SUP. CT. RULES, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(3) (1985) ("A
candidate, including an incumbent judge, shall comply with the provisions of the
Nevada Election Campaign Practices Act, as adopted in 1975 and now appearing
as*NRS 294A.010 et seq.").
143. See ALASKA RULES OF COURT PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION vol. III
(1985); 255 Ark. 1075 (1973-74) (per curiam) (supreme court declared that the
ABA Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes proper standards for the judiciary of
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and campaign funds in the manner provided in subsection B(2)."' 1"
One state, that has otherwise adopted the model, does not require
the candidacy to have drawn active opposition.' 5 Another state has
deleted both that requirement and the requirement that there be no
competing candidate. 46
Florida's Canon 7B(3) provides that "[a]n incumbent judge who
is a candidate for retention in office or re-election to office without
a competing candidate, may conduct only limited campaign activities
until such time as the judge certifies that his candidacy has drawn
active opposition."'' 4 7 The term "limited campaign activities" is de-
fined as including the conduct authorized by the state's subsection
B(2),'14 which is substantially the same as Canon 7B(2) of the CJC. 149
After certifying that his candidacy has drawn active opposition, the
judge may campaign "in any manner authorized by law, subject
[only] to the restrictions of subsection B(1)." 0 Thus, an incumbent
the state); IND. CODE ANN., COURT RULES (Burns Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 20-176 (1981); MINN. RULES OF COURT, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (West 1986);
Mo. RULES OF COURT, SUP. CT. RULE 2 (West 1986); NEB. CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT (available in Fordham Urban Law Journal Office); N.Y. JUD. LAW app.
(McKinney 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT., RULES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1984); N.D.
COURT RULES, RULES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (West 1984); OKLA. COURT RULES &
PROC., CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (West 1985-86); S.C. CODE ANN., SUP. CT.
RULE 33 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. ch. 16-2 app.
(1979); UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (Executive director of Utah Judicial
Conduct Commission stated in a telephone conversation on 2/19/86 that the Utah
Supreme Court adopted the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, app. VIII, A.O.10 (Supp. 1984); WASH. REV. CODE, RULES OF CT., CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1983); Wyo. CT. RULES ANN., CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
(Michie 1985).
144. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(3) (1972). The Supreme Court
of one state has adopted a single rule that governs the campaign conduct of both
candidates for initial election and incumbents seeking retention of office. See supra
note 120 and accompanying text.
145. See PA. RULES OF COURT, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(3) (West
1986).
146. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN., SUP. CT. RULE 81, Canon 7B(3) (Supp. 1985).
The subdivision provides in full: "An incumbent judge who is a candidate for
retention in or re-election to office may campaign for retention or re-election to
office; may obtain publicly stated support; and in the manner provided in subsection
B(2) may obtain compaign funds." Id.
147. FLA. STAT. ANN., BAR & JUDICIARY RULES, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 7B(3) (West 1983).
148. Id.
149. FLA. STAT. ANN., BAR & JUDICIARY RULES, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 7B(2) (West 1983). For a discussion of the differences between the model
Canon 7B(2) and Florida's version, see supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
150. FLA. STAT. ANN., BAR & JUDICIARY RULES, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 7B(3) (West 1983). Subsection B(I) is nearly identical to that of the Model
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judge in Florida who is running without competing candidates and
who can demonstrate that his candidacy has drawn active opposition,
may conduct his campaign without the restrictions imposed by the
prohibitions of Canon 7B(2) binding other candidates for judicial
office. The commentary to Florida's Canon 71(3) provides that while
the term "active opposition" is difficult to define, it is intended to
include any form of organized public opposition or an unfavorable
vote on a bar poll."'
New Mexico's code seems to provide that regardless of whether
or not a judge's candidacy has drawn "active opposition," in the
event that he does not have an opponent, he may not retain funds
that have been contributed for his campaign.' 5 2 Thus, it appears
that unless the candidate is expected to use only his own resources,
he is forbidden to campaign for retention in, or re-election to,
judicial office.
In Colorado and Iowa, where judicial elections are held only on
a merit retention basis, codes of judicial conduct have been adopted
with a Canon 7B(2) that is applicable only to candidates for retention
Code of Judicial Conduct. Compare MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
7B(I) (1972) with FLA. STAT. ANN., BAR & JUDICIARY RULES, CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 7B(I) (West 1983). Florida's Canon 7B(I) provides in full:
A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office that is
filled either by public election between competing candidates or on the
basis of a merit system election: (a) should maintain the dignity appro-
priate to judicial office; (b) should prohibit public officials or employees
subject to his direction or control from doing for him what he is prohibited
from doing under this canon; and except to the extent authorized under
subsection B(2) or B(3), he should not allow any other person to do for
him what he is prohibited from doing under this canon; (c) should not
make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful
and impartial performance of the duties of the office; announce his views
on disputed legal or political issues; or misrepresent his identity, qual-
ifications, present position, or other fact.
FLA. STAT. ANN., BAR & JUDICIARY RULES, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
7B(l) (West 1983).
151. FLA. STAT. ANN., BAR & JUDICIARY RULES, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 7B(3) commentary (West 1983). Neither the ABA nor any of the other
states define the term "active opposition" in their codes of judicial conduct.
152. The code provides:
B. Unopposed campaign. A candidate for judicial office who has a
campaign fund or any other mechanism for the collection and disburse-
ment of campaign contributions, and for any reason, at any time, does
not have an opponent, shall return all unused funds pro rata to the
contributors within thirty days of the time he determines he has no
opponent. If for any reason the contribution cannot be refunded to the
contributor it may be donated to a charitable organization.
N.M. STAT. ANN., JUDICIAL CHAPTER 15, Canon 8B (1985).
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in office, thus, eliminating the need for a Canon 7B(3).' 53 Iowa's
code simply provides that "[a] judge who is a candidate for retention
in office without a competing candidate, and whose candidacy has
drawn active opposition, may campaign in response thereto and may
establish committees of responsible persons to obtain publicly stated
support and campaign funds."'15 4 Colorado's code provides that "if
there is active opposition to the retention of a candidate judge,"
a nonpartisan committee may be organized to raise funds for the
judge's campaign, but that the judge should not personally solicit
or accept funds, and should not be advised of the source of any
campaign contributions.'55 Thus, in Colorado, candidates for reten-
tion in judicial office are bound by restrictions similar to those
stated in Canon 7B(2) of the CJC and the comment thereto.
C. State Enforcement of Canon 7B(2)
There is some debate over the legal effect that may be attached
to a Code of Judicial Conduct. In Alabama, where Canons were
adopted as "a Code for judges and a declaration of that which the
people of the state .. .have a right to expect of them,"' 5 6 a court
has suggested that the Canons have the force of law.' 57 However,
the Supreme Court of Colorado has held that judicial and profes-
sional ethics codes cannot be given the effect of law, but rather,
"are recognized generally as a system of principles of exemplary
conduct and good character."' 58 When the Supreme Court of Ar-
kansas declared that the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct "constitutes
proper standards for the Judiciary of [the] State,"' 5 9 one Justice
dissented, commenting: "Even if the per curiam adopting the 'Judicial
Code' be considered only as a guide to judicial conduct and not as
a rule of judicial conduct, still we are giving the appearance of
legislating and with some logic can be accused of legislating contrary
153. See CoLO. REV. STAT., COURT RULES ch. 24 app., CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 7B(2) (Supp. 1984); IOWA CODE ANN. § 610 app., CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 7B(2) (West 1975).
154. IOWA CODE ANN. § 610 app., CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(2)
(West 1975).
155. COLO. REV. STAT., COURT RULES ch. 24 app., CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 7B(2) (Supp. 1984).
156. ALA. CODE, RULES OF ALABAMA SUPREME COURT, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
preamble (1984).
157. See Wallace v. Wallace, 352 So. 2d 1376, 1378 n.1 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977).
158. In re Colorado Bar Ass'n, 137 Colo. 357, 363, 325 P.2d 932, 935 (1958)
(citing In re Canon 35, 132 Colo. 591, 296 P.2d 465 (1955)).
159. 255 Ark. 1075 (1973-74).
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to the Constitution."'' 60 However, the Supreme Court of Florida has
asserted that there is no need for specific constitutional authority
because "[t]he authority for each branch to adopt an ethical code
has always been within the inherent authority of the respective
branches of government."' 6 ' Notwithstanding the debate on the effect
of a Code of Judicial Conduct, most of the states have established
procedures for the investigation of judicial misconduct.' 61
Judicial conduct commissions have been established in a majority
of the fifty states and the District of Columbia. 63 The commissions
have from five to fourteen members, generally consisting of judges,
160. Id. at 1076-77.
161. In re Florida Bar, 316 So. 2d 45, 47 (Fla. 1975).
162. See infra notes 163-90 and accompanying text.
163. See ALA. CONST. amend. 328, § 6.17 (Judicial Inquiry Commission); ALASKA
CONST. art. IV, § 10 (1956, amended 1982) (Commission on Judicial Conduct);
ARIz. CONST. art. VI.I, § 1 (Commission on Judicial Qualifications); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 22-144 (Supp. 1985) (Judicial Qualifications Commission); CAL. CONST. art.
VI, § 8 (1879, amended 1976) (Commission on Judicial Performance); COLO. CONST.
art. VI, § 23(3) (1876, amended 1982) (Commission on Judicial Discipline); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-51K (West 1985) (Judicial Review Council); DEL. CONST.
art. IV, § 37 (Court on the Judiciary); D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1521 (1981) (Com-
mission on Judicial Disabilities and Tenure); FLA. CONST. art. V, § 12 (1885,
amended 1976) (Judicial Qualifications Commission); GA. CONST. art. VI, § VII,
VI (Judicial Qualifications Commission); RULES OF COURT, THE JUDICIARY OF
HAWAII vol. 2, SUP. CT. RULE 8.1 (1984) (Commission on Judicial Discipline);
IDAHO CODE § 1-2101 (1979) (Judicial Council); ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 15(b) (Judicial
Inquiry Board); Ky. CONST. § 121 (1891, amended 1976) (Judicial Retirement and
Removal Commission); LA. CONST. art. V, § 25 (Judiciary Commission); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 9-B (Supp. 1985) (Committee on Judicial Responsibility and
Disability); MD. CONST. art. IV, § 4A (1867, amended 1980) (Commission on
Judicial Disabilities); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 211C, § I (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp.
1985) (Commission on Judicial Conduct); MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 30 (Judicial
Tenure Commission); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 490.15 (West Supp. 1985) (Board on
Judicial Standards); Miss. CONST. art. 6, § 177A (Commission on Judicial Per-
formance); Mo. CONST. art. V, § 24 (1945, amended 1976) (Commission on Re-
tirement, Removal and Discipline of Judges); NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-715 (Supp.
1984) (Commission on Judicial Qualifications); NEV. CONST. art. 6, § 21 (Commission
on Judicial Discipline); N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 32 (1911, amended 1978) (Judicial
Standards Commission); N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 22 (1894, amended 1977) (Commission
on Judicial Conduct); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-375 (1981) (Judicial Standards Com-
mission); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-23-02 (Supp. 1985) (Commission on Judicial
Conduct); OHIO REV. CODE ANN., SUP. CT. RULES FOR THE Gov'T OF THE JUDICIARY
Rule 11(l) (Page Supp. 1984) (Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline
of the Judiciary); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1652 (West Supp. 1985) (Council
on Judicial Complaints); OR. REV. STAT. § 1.410 (1985) (Commission on Judicial
Fitness); PA. CONST. art. V, § 18 (Judicial Inquiry and Review Board); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 8-16-1 (1985) (Commission on Judicial Tenure and Discipline); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 16-1A-2 (1979) (Commission on Judicial Qualifications); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 17-5-201 (Supp. 1985) (Court of the Judiciary); TEX. CONST. art. V, § l-
a (1876, amended 1984) (State Commission on Judicial Conduct); UTAH CODE ANN.
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members of the bar, and other residents of the state. 64 In some
states, these commissions have the power to censure, suspend, or
remove offending judges. 65 In other states, they have power only
to recommend that discipline be taken by the highest court of the state' 66
§ 78-7-27 (Supp. 1985) (Commission on Judicial Conduct); VA. CODE § 2.1-37.3
(1979) (Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission); WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 31
(Judicial Qualifications Commission); W. VA. CODE, CT. RULES OF PROC. FOR
HANDLING OF COMPLAINTS AGAINST JUSTICES, JUDGES AND MAGISTRATES Rule IIA
(Supp. 1985) (Judicial Investigation Board); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 757.83 (West Supp.
1985) (Judicial Commission); Wyo. CONST. art. 5, § 6 (1890, amended 1972) (Judicial
Supervisory Commission).
164. See ALA. CONST. amend. 328, § 6.17(a); ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 10
(1956, amended 1982); ARIZ. CONST. art. VI.I, § 1; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 22-145(a)
(Supp. 1985); CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 8 (1879, amended 1976); COLO. CONST. art.
VI, § 23(3) (1876, amended 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-51K (West 1985);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1522 (1981); FLA. CONST. art. V, § 12 (1885, amended 1976);
GA. CONST. art. VI, § VII, VI; RULES OF COURT, THE JUDICIARY OF HAWAII
Vol. 2, SuP. CT. RULE 8.1(a) (1984); IDAHO CODE § 1-2101 (1979); ILL. CONST.
art. VI, § 15(b); Ky. CONST. § 121 (1891, amended 1976); LA. CONST. art. V, §
25(A); MD. CONST. art. IV, § 4A (1867, amended 1980); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
211C, § 1 (Michie/Law. Co-op, Supp. 1985); MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 30(1); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 490-15(1) (West Supp. 1985); MIss. CONST. art. 6, § 177A; Mo.
CONST. art. V, § 24(1) (1945, amended 1976); NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-715 (Supp.
1984); NEV. CONST. art. 6, § 21(2); N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 32 (1911, amended
1978); N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 22b.(1) (1894, amended 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
7A-375(a) (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-23-02 (Supp. 1985); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN., SUP. CT. RULES FOR THE GOV'T OF THE JUDICIARY Rule II(1) (Page Supp.
1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 1.410(1) (1985); PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(a); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 8-16-1(a) (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 16-1A-2 (1979); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 17-5-201(a) (Supp. 1985); TEX. CONST. art. V, § l-a(2) (1876, amended
1984); VA. CODE § 2.1-37.3 (1979); WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 31; W. VA. CODE,
CT. RULES OF PROC. FOR HANDLING OF COMPLAINTS AGAINST JUSTICES, JUDGES AND
MAGISTRATES Rule IIA (Supp. 1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 757.83(1) (West Supp.
1985); Wyo. CONST. art. 5, § 6 (1890, amended 1972). In one state, "[tihe Council
shall consist of three (3) members, only two of whom shall be members of the
Bar ...... OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1653 (West Supp. 1985). In another state,
commission membership includes members of the senate, house of representatives
and board of commissioners of the state bar, as well as 2 persons who are not
members of the state bar. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-7-27(1) (Supp. 1985).
165. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1521 (1981); GA. CONST. art. VI, § VII, VI;
Ky. CONST. § 121 (1891, amended 1976); NEV. CONST. art. 6, § 21(l); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-7-30 (Supp. 1985).
166. See ARIZ. CONST. art. VI.I, § 4; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 22-145(b) (Supp. 1985);
COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 23(3)(e) (1876, amended 1982); FLA. CONST. art. V, §
12(a) (1885, amended 1976); RULES OF COURT, THE JUDICIARY OF HAWAII vol. 2,
SUP. CT. RULE 8.2(a)(6) (1985); IDAHO CODE § 1-2103 (1979); LA. CONST. art. V,
§ 25; MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 211C, § 2 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985); MICH.
CONST. art. VI, § 30(2); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 490.16(3) (West Supp. 1985); Miss.
CONST. art. 6, § 177A; Mo. CONST. art. V, § 24(3) (1945, amended 1976); N.M.
CONST. art. VI, § 32 (1911, amended 1978); N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 22 (1894,
amended 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-376 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-23-
19861 JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS
or by a Court on the Judiciary.' 7 In still other states, commissions
have the power to reprimand or censure a judge, but can only recom-
mend his suspension or removal.' 68 In many jurisdictions, violations
of the Code of Judicial Conduct are either constitutional or statutory
grounds for censure, suspension, or removal of a judge.'"9 In other
jurisdictions, judicial conduct commissions must determine whether
a judge's actions constitute "conduct prejudicial to the administration
of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute" or "conduct
unbecoming a member of the judiciary."' 70 However, such language
has been interpreted to include violations of the Code of Judicial Con-
03(2), (3) (Supp. 1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN., SUP. CT. RULES FOR THE GOV'T
OF THE JUDICIARY Rule 11(2) (Page Supp. 1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 1.420(4) (1985);
PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(g); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. ch. 16-IA app. (17) (1979);
VA. CODE § 2.1-37.4 (1979); WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 31; W. VA. CODE, CT.
RULES OF PROC. FOR HANDLING OF COMPLAINTS AGAINST JUSTICES, JUDGES AND
MAGISTRATES Rule IIB, D (Supp. 1985) (Judicial Investigation Commission files
complaints with Judicial Hearing Board which makes recommendations to supreme
court); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 757.85(5) (West Supp. 1985); Wyo. CONST. art. 5, §
6(e) (1890, amended 1972).
167. See ALA. CONST. amend. 328, § 6.17(b); ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 15(c); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1651 (West Supp. 1985).
168. See ALASKA STAT. § 22.30.01 I(d) (Supp. 1985); CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18(c)
(1879, amended 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-5In(a) (West 1985) (judicial
review council may also suspend the judge for a definite term not to exceed one
year); MD. CONST. art. IV, § 4B(a) (1867, amended 1980); NED. REV. STAT. § 24-
721 (1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-16-4 (c), (d) (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-5-309
(Supp. 1985); TEX. CONST. art. V, § l-a(8) (1876, amended 1984).
169. See ALA. CONST. amend. 328, § 6.17(b); ALASKA STAT. § 22.30.011(a)(3)(E)
(Supp. 1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 22-145(e) (Supp. 1985); CoLo. CONST. art. VI,
§ 23(3)(d) (1876, amended 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-51i (West 1985);
RULES OF COURT, THE JUDICIARY OF HAWAII vol. 2, SUP. CT. RULE 8.5(a)(5) (1984);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 211C, § 2 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 27-23-03(3) (Supp. 1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN., SUP. CT. RULES FOR
THE GOV'T OF THE JUDICIARY Rule II(5)(a) (Page Supp. 1984); PA. CONST. art. V,
§§ 17(b), 18(d); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-16-4(c) (1985); TEX. CONST. art. V, § l-a(6)
(1876, amended 1984); WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 31; W. VA. CODE, CT. RULES OF
PROC. FOR HANDLING OF COMPLAINTS AGAINST JUSTICES, JUDGES AND MAGISTRATES
Rule IIB (Supp. 1985).
170. ARIZ. CONST. art. VI.I, § 4; CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18(c) (1879, amended
1976); D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1526(a)(2)(C) (1981); FLA. CONST. art. V, § 12(f)
(1885, amended 1976); GA. CONST. art. VI, § VII, VII; IDAHO CODE § 1-2103
(1979); ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 15(e); LA. CONST. art. V, § 25(C); MD. CONST. art.
IV, § 4B(b) (1867, amended 1980) ("conduct prejudicial to the proper administration
of justice"); MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 30(2) ("conduct that is clearly prejudicial
to the administration of justice"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 490.16(3) (West Supp.
1985); MIss. CONST. art. 6, § 177A(e); NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-722 (Supp. 1984);
N.C, GEN. STAT. § 7A-376 (1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. ch. 16-lA app. (5)
(1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-7-28(1)(e) (Supp. 1985); VA. CONST. art. 6, § 10
("conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice"); WYo. CONST. art.
5, § 6(e) (1890, amended 1972).
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duct.' 7 ' A judge may be disciplined "for good cause" in other states.' 72
A few states have expressly provided in their Codes of Judicial Conduct
that violations of the Code shall be investigated by a judicial conduct
commission.'
Although procedures for the enforcement of the Code of Judicial
Conduct clearly have been established, it is not clear what percentage
of judicial ethics violations are investigated. Most proceedings of
the judicial conduct commissions are confidential, at least until a
complaint or recommendation is filed with the court.7 4 Private
censure, in no event, would be made public. Even in states where
code violations are possible grounds for the discipline of judges, it
is recognized that not every code violation warrants the public
171. See, e.g., In re Babineaux, 346 So. 2d 676 (La.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
940 (1977); In re Foster, 271 Md. 449, 318 A.2d 523 (1974).
172. See Ky. CONST. § 121 (1891, amended 1976); N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 22(a)
(1894, amended 1977); Wis. CONST. art. VII, § 11. The New York Court of Appeals
has stated that the Judicial Canons add meaning to the term "for cause." Steinberg
v. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 51 N.Y.2d 74, 409 N.E.2d 1378, 431 N.Y.S.2d
704 (1980). Rules adopted by the Kentucky Supreme Court grant the Judicial
Retirement and Removal Commission the authority to discipline a judge for vio-
lations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. See Ky. REV. STAT., SUP. CT. RULE
4.020(b)(v) (Supp. 1984).
173. See FLA. STAT. ANN., BAR & JUDICIARY RULES, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
preface (West 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN., JUDICIAL CHAPTER 15, miscellaneous pro-
vision B (1985).
174. See ALA. CONST. amend. 328, § 6.17(b); ALASKA STAT. § 22.30.060(b) (Supp.
1985); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN., RULE OF PROCEDURE FOR THE COMMISSION ON
JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS 5 (Supp. 1985); CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18(f) (1879, amended
1976); CoLo. CONST. art. VI, § 23(3)(g) (1876, amended 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 51-511(a) (West 1985); DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 37; D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-
1528 (1981); FLA. CONST. art. V, § 12(d) (1885, amended 1976); RULES OF THE
JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS COMMISSION, 246 Ga. 823, 834 (1980); RULES OF COURT,
THE JUDICIARY OF HAWAII vol. 2, SUP. CT. RULE 8.4 (1984); IDAHO CODE § 1-
2103 (1979); ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 15(c); Ky. REV. STAT., SUP. CT. RULE 4.130
(1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN., SUP. CT. RULE XXIII, § 23(a) (West 1986); MD.
CONST. art. IV, § 4B(a) (1867, amended 1980); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 211C, § 2
(Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985); MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 30(2); MINN. RULES
OF COURT, RULES OF BOARD ON JUDICIAL STANDARDS Rule 5 (West 1986); Miss.
CONST. art. 6, § 177A; Mo. RULES OF COURT, SUP. CT. RULE 12.23 (West 1986);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-726 (Supp. 1984); NEV. CONST. art. 6, § 21(5)(a); N.M.
CONST. art. VI, § 32 (1911, amended 1978); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 45 (McKinney Supp.
1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-377(a) (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-23-03(5) (Supp.
1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN., SUP. CT. RULES FOR THE GOV'T OF THE JUDICIARY
Rule 11(21) (Page Supp. 1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1658 (West Supp.
1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 1.440'(1985); PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(h); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 8-16-4(c) (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 16-IA, app., Rule 4 (1979); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 17-5-304 (Supp. 1985); TEX. CONST. art. V, § l-a(10) (1876, amended
1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-7-30(3) (Supp. 1985); VA. CODE § 2.1-37.13 (Supp.
1985); WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 31; W. VA. CODE, CT. RULES OF PROC. FOR
HANDLING OF COMPLAINTS AGAINST JUSTICES, JUDGES AND MAGISTRATES Rule IIG
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discipline of a judge.7 5 Indeed, although there is one case in which
a judge was issued a public reprimand for a single occasion of
soliciting campaign funds, 7 6 most reported cases concern judges who
have been involved in many different kinds and repeated instances
of judicial misconduct.' 77 Moreover, certain statements of the survey
respondents seem to indicate that there are numerous undisciplined
abuses of Canon 7B(2).' 7 1
There are code enforcement difficulties unique to Canon 7B. While
Canon 7B(2) applies to all candidates for judicial office,'7 9 state
judicial conduct commissions only have jurisdiction over judicial
officers.'8 0 However, in at least one state, the attorney general has
(Supp. 1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 757.93 (West Supp. 1985); Wyo. CT. RULES
ANN., JUDICIAL SUPERVISORY COMMISSION RULE 7 (Michie 1979). See generally
Annot., 5 A.L.R. 4th 730 (1981) (Confidentiality of proceedings or reports of judicial
inquiry commissions).
175. In re Kapcia, 389 Mich. 306, 312, 205 N.W.2d 436, 439 (1973) ("violation
of the canons of ethics does not necessarily warrant disciplinary action through
the Tenure Commission; ... each case is to be judged in the light of all the
circumstances"). The statute of one state provides: "If the preliminary investigation
discloses that there exists a violation of the canons of judicial ethics and said
violation is not one of a serious nature, the commission may in its discretion issue
a private reprimand to the judge .... " R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-16-4(c) (1985).
176. In re Hotchkiss, 415 Mich. 1101, 327 N.W.2d 312 (1982).
177. E.g., Steinberg v. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 51 N.Y.2d 74, 409
N.E.2d 1378, 431 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1980) (acted as broker in several high interest
loan transactions; received percentage of interest rate on loans; attempted to conceal
true identity from borrower in one of the transactions; and intentionally misrep-
resented income and allowable deductions on Federal income tax returns); In re
Jordan, 290 Or. 303, 622 P.2d 297 (1981) (gave false testimony under oath; in
sentencing defendants, was influenced by previous, improper ex parte recommen-
dations; was discourteous to parties in court; improperly held private conference
in chambers with witness; held trial and entered finding of guilty against absent
defendant; and refused to disqualify himself from hearing in which his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned); In re Heuermann, 90 S.D. 312, 240 N.W.2d 603(1976) (for over a decade, sat on cases in which wife appeared; approved attorney
fees paid to wife, which were then deposited into joint checking account; sent
letter strongly criticizing attorney to both the attorney's client and parties considering
suit against that client; and revoked suspension of a juvenile sentence without a
hearing; traveled at county expense to Florida to pick up runaway boys and while
there attended a football game); In re Buchanan, 100 Wash. 2d 396, 669 P.2d
1248 (1983) (engaged in several instances of sexual harassment, both verbal and
physical; made religious slurs; and gave indication of retaliation against witnesses
who testified against him before the Commission).
178. See infra note 245 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text. One state's Code of Judicial
Conduct makes explicit that the Canon applies to all candidates for judicial office.
See OR. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7D (1983) (available in Fordham Urban
Law Journal Office).
180. See ALA. CONST. amend. 328, § 6.17(b); ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 10 (1956,
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ruled that the commission has jurisdiction over other successful
candidates for past campaign conduct violations.' In other states,
courts have held that judicial conduct commissions may investigate
acts committed by a judge prior to the time he assumed judicial
office.' In two states, a judge may be censured or removed "for
action occurring not more than 6 years prior to the commencement
of the judge's current term."' 83 Thus, it would appear that the
commissions in these states would be able to recommend the discipline
of a successful candidate for past campaign conduct violations.
Under no circumstances would the majority of judicial conduct
commissions have jurisdiction over unsuccessful candidates who have
never been members of the bench. 8 4 However, some states have
amended 1968); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN., RULE OF PROCEDURE FOR THE COMMISSION
ON JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS 4 (Supp. 1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 22-144 (Supp.
1985); CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18 (1879, amended 1976); COLO. CONST. art. VI, §
23(3)(d) (1876, amended 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-51K (West 1985);
DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 37; D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1521 (1981); FLA. CONST. art.
V, § 12(d) (1885, amended 1976); GA. CONST. art. VI, § VII, VI; HAWAII RULES
OF COURT, THE JUDICIARY OF HAWAII vol. 2, SUP. CT. RULE 8.2(b) (1985); IDAHO
CODE § 1-2102(4) (Supp. 1985); ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 15(c); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.,
SuP. CT. RULE XXIII, § 2(b) (West 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 9-B
(Supp. 1985); MD. CONST. art. IV, § 4B (1867, amended 1980); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 211C, § 2 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985); MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 30;
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 490.18 (West Supp. 1985); Miss. CONST. art. 6, § 177A; Mo.
CONST. art. V, § 24 (1945, amended 1976); NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-721 (Supp. 1984);
NEV. CONST. art. 6, § 21(1); N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 32 (1911, amended 1978);
N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 22(a) (1894, amended 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-376
(1981); N.D. CENT. CODE 27-23-02 (Supp. 1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 1.420 (1985);
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2105 (1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-16-4(b) (1985); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 16-IA-1(2) (Supp. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-5-102
(Supp. 1985); TEX. CONST. art. V, § 1-a(6)(A) (1876, amended 1984); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-7-30(1) (Supp. 1985); VA. CODE § 2.1-37.1 (Supp. 1985); WASH. CONST.
art. IV, § 31; W. VA. CODE, CT. RULES OF PROC. FOR HANDLING OF COMPLAINTS
AGAINST JUSTICES, JUDGES AND MAGISTRATES Rule IB(7) (Supp. 1985); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 757.85 (West Supp. 1985); WYo. CT. RULES ANN., JUDICIAL SUPERVISORY
COMMISSION RULE 2(b) (1979). But see KY. REV. STAT., SUP. CT. RULE 4.000 (Supp.
1984) (providing that during their candidacy, lawyers seeking judicial office shall
be deemed subject to the jurisdiction and discipline of the Commission); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN., SUP. CT. RULES FOR THE GOV'T OF THE JUDICIARY Rule 11(2) (Page
Supp. 1984) (Board of Commissioners has jurisdiction over a judge or candidate
for judicial office).
181. Op. Att'y Gen., Letter Op. 27 (Wash. 1982).
182. See, e.g., In re Ryman, 394 Mich. 637, 232 N.W.2d 178 (1975).
183. ALASKA STAT. § 22.30.070(c) (1982); CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 18(c)(2) (1879,
amended 1976).
184. But see KY. REV. STAT., SUP. CT. RULE 4.000 (Supp. 1984) (providing that
during their candidacy, lawyers seeking judicial office shall be deemed subject to
the jurisdiction and discipline of the Commission); OHIO REV. CODE ANN., SuP.
CT. RULES FOR THE GOV'T OF THE JUDICIARY Rule 11(2) (Page Supp. 1984) (Board
of Commissioners has jurisdiction over a judge or candidate for judicial office).
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followed the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility" 5 or
Model Rules of Professional Conduct 86 in requiring that a lawyer
who is a candidate for judicial office abide by Canon 7 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct. 8 7 In these states, unsuccessful candidates would
be subject to the jurisdiction of a separate disciplinary authority
empowered to enforce the Code of Professional Responsibility. 88
New Mexico's Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
Violations hereof by candidates for judicial office who are not
current members of the judiciary shall, in respect to persons who
are members of the bar, be deemed to constitute violations of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Such violations shall be
investigated, charged, prosecuted and disposition made thereof in
the same manner as other violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. 9
In Alabama, "a candidate for any judicial office not subject to the
jurisdiction of the judicial inquiry commission or the court of the
185. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 8-103 (1979).
186. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.2(b) (1984).
187. ARIZ. SUP. CT. RULE 42 (West 1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. tit. 27 app. RULES
OF COURT, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule I (1979); CONN. RULES OF COURT,
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (West 1985); D.C. COURT RULES ANN. (Michie
1985); ILL. SUP. CT. RULES ch. 1IOA, art. VII (West 1985); MINN. RULES OF CT.,
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (WEST 1986); Mo. RULES OF CT., SUP. CT. RULE
4 (West 1986); Order of Neb. State Sup. "Ct. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
(1975); NEV. SUP. CT. RULES (West 1985); N.Y. JUD. LAW app. (McKinney Supp.
1984-85); N.D. RULES OF CT. (West 1984); PA. RULES OF CT. Rule 205 (West 1985);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. tit. 16-18, app. (1979); TENN. CODE ANN., RULES OF
SUP. CT. Rule 8 (1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. XII, app. IX (1977); Order of Wash.
State Sup. Ct., 80 Wash. 2d 1119 (1971); W. VA. CODE, CT. RULES (1980); Wyo.
STATE BAR ASS'N RULE 20 (1977). North Dakota's Rules of Judicial Conduct provide
that "[rjule 7 ... applies to non-judge attorney candidates by incorporation by
references in DR 8-103(A) of the Code of Professional Responsibility." N.D. COURT
RULES, RULES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (West 1984).
188. See ARIZ. REV. STAT., SUP. CT. RULE 47 (West Supp. 1985); ARK. STAT.
ANN. tit. 27 app. RULES OF COURT, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 11
(Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-90 (West 1985); D.C. COURT RULES
ANN., D.C. BAR RULE II (Michie 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I10A, § 751 (Smith-
Hurd 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN., RULES ON LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Rule 3 (West 1980); Mo. RULES OF CT., SUP. CT. RULE 5.10 (West 1986); NEB.
SUP. CT. DISCIPLINARY RULES (1982); NEV. REV. STAT., SUP. CT. RULE 99 (1985);
N.Y. JUD. LAW § 90(2) (McKinney 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-14-03 (1974);
PA. RULES OF COURT, RULES OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT Rule 207 (West 1986);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 16-19-21 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN., SUP. CT. RULE
9, § 1.1 (1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, app. VIII, A.O.09 (Supp. 1984); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 2.48.060 (1961); W. VA. CODE, CONST. OF THE W. VA. STATE
BAR art. VI, § 4 (1982); WYO. COURT RULES, DISCIPLINARY CODE FOR THE WYO.
STATE BAR Rule 1 (1979).
189. N.M. STAT. ANN., JUDICIAL CHAPTER 15, miscellaneous provision C (1985).
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judiciary who breaches any applicable mandatory provision of [the]
canons shall be subject to the original jurisdiction of the supreme
court [of the state]. '"190
In sum, several states have expressed dissatisfaction with Model
Canon 7B(2), by either eliminating or substantially modifying their
own campaign conduct provisions. While most of the states have
created judicial conduct enforcement commissions, it appears that
few have taken steps to police the campaign conduct of all candidates
for judicial office. It is time for both the adoption of a more
generally acceptable Model Canon 7B(2) and the establishment of
state procedures for effective enforcement of the provision against
judges and non-incumbents, alike.
IV. The Survey
In April of 1985, a survey'9 ' regarding judicial elections was mailed
to a nationwide random sample of elected judges. 92 The purpose
of the survey was to determine the judges' views as to the stance
the legal profession should take regarding the financing of campaigns
for judicial election. The judges were asked to answer six multiple
choice questions, each with six possible responses, and to write, at
their option, one essay. The multiple choice questions were based
upon the suggestions and requirements of Canon 7B(2) of the CJC,' 93
particularly on the financing guidelines of the campaign conduct
provision. 94 The essay question allowed the judge a final opportunity
to provide any additional comments he had concerning ethics and
judicial campaign conduct, including descriptions of his own cam-
paign experiences. In an attempt to obtain candid results, the judges
were requested not to reveal their names. However, for the purposes
of statistical analysis, the judges were requested to provide the names
of their states.
190. ALA. CODE, RULES OF ALABAMA SUPREME COURT, CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS
Canon 7C (1984).
191. The survey is reprinted in full at Appendix A.
192. For a discussion of the selection and composition of the sample group, see
infra notes 195-99 and accompanying text.
193. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972). See supra note 16 and accom-
panying text for the full text of this Canon.
194. Each judge was asked to answer the questions in accordance with his personal
opinions regarding appropriate campaigning behavior, and not to answer solely
upon his state's current code of ethics. For a discussion of the various state codes
of ethics, see supra notes 105-55 and accompanying text.
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A. Selection and Composition of Sample Group
The survey was sent to 1,000 general jurisdiction judges in the
states that elect judges at that level. 95 The sample group was limited
to judges who must initially stand for election,' 96 because it is this
group that is most directly affected by the tensions that are created
when a judge is required to campaign. 97 The sample group did not
include those judges who are initially appointed and may or may
not be required to stand for retention election. 98 The sample group
was limited to the general jurisdiction level because it is that level
that provided the largest single elected group. The judges were
randomly selected to participate in the survey. 99
B. The Results of the Survey-Multiple Choice Questions
Each judge was requested to answer the multiple choice questions
in accordance with his own personal beliefs about appropriate cam-
paign behavior for a candidate in a judicial election. The judge was
given a choice of six possible responses for each question:
195. See ALA. CONST. amend. 328, § 6.13; ARiz. CONST. art. 6 § 12; ARK.
CONST. art. VII, § 17; CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 16; FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 10(b); GA.
CODE ANN. § 21-2-138 (1985); IDAHO CONST. art V, § 11; IDAHO CODE § 1-702
(1974); ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 12; IND. CODE ANN. § 33-4-4-1 (Burns 1978); KAN.
CONST. art. 3, § 6; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-336 (1981); Ky. CONST. § 117; LA.
REV. STAT. .ANN. § 13:585 (West 1946); MD. CONST. art. IV, § 5; MICH. CONST.
art. VI, § 11; MINN. CONST. art. 6, § 7; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 487.03(2) (West
1981); MISS. CONST. art. 6, § 153; MISS. CODE ANN. § 9-7-1 (1972); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 9-5-1 (1972); Mo. CONST. art. V, § 16; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 478.010 (Vernon
1979); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 3-5-201 (1983); NEV. CONST. art. 6, § 5 (1981);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 3.080 (1957); N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 12; N.Y. CONST. art. 6,
§§ 6, 10: N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 9; N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-05-02 (1974); OHIO
CONST. art., IV, § 6(A)(3); OKLA. CONST. art. 7, § 9; OR. CONST. art. VII, § 1;
OR. REV. STAT. § 3.030 (1981); PA. CONST. art. 5, § 13; 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3131(a), (c) (Purdon 1980); S.D. CONST. art. V, § 7; TENN. CONST. art. 6, § 4;
TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-103 (1980); TEX. CONST. art. 5, § 7; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. § 1884 (Vernon 1964); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-1-7.7 (1984); WASH. CONST.
art. IV, § 5; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 2.08.060 (1961); W. VA. CONST. art. 8,
§ 5; W. VA. CODE § 51-2-1 (1981); Wis. CONST. art. 7, § 7.
196. For a discussion of judicial selection methods, see supra notes 88-104 and
accompanying text.
197. For a discussion of these tensions, see supra notes 6-10 and accompanying
text.
198. For a discussion of judicial selection methods, see supra notes 88-104 and
accompanying text.
199. The total number of general jurisdiction judges in the 34 states was 6,236
at the time of the mailing of the survey. A complete list of the names and addresses
of the judges was supplied by the National Judicial College, Reno, Nevada.
A chart of random numbers was used to select the 1,000 participants and to
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- No, I believe the behavior is definitely inappropriate.
- No, I believe the behavior is generally inappropriate.
- No, I believe the behavior is generally inappropriate, but there
are exceptions: [space was left for any comments the judge might
have as to exceptions].
- Yes, I believe the behavior is generally appropriate, but there
are exceptions: [space was left for any comments the judge might
have as to exceptions].
- Yes, I believe the behavior is generally appropriate.
- Yes, I believe the behavior is definitely appropriate. 200
Approximately fifty percent of the judges questioned responded
to the survey. 20 The results of the survey have been analyzed from
two viewpoints. First, this Note will discuss the statistical breakdown
and interpretation of the multiple choice questions, 20 2 and subse-
quently it will discuss the judges responses to the essay question.20 3
1. Question 1: "Do you believe a judicial candidate should be
permitted to personally solicit campaign funds for his/her own
election campaign?"
Over two-thirds of the judges who responded to question one
stated that they believed that this particular campaign activity is
inappropriate behavior for a judicial candidate. 204 Forty-four percent
of the judges revealed that they felt that personally soliciting cam-
paign funds for a judicial campaign is definitely inappropriate be-
havior, 205 while a total of thirty percent of the judges responded
that the behavior is appropriate, in varying degrees. 20 6 Canon 7B(2)
of the CJC states, "a candidate . . . should not himself solicit ...
insure that the sample was truly random. HANDBOOK OF TABLES FOR PROBABILITY
AND STATISTICS 341 (W. Beyer, ed. 1966).
200. For the complete text of the survey, see infra Appendix A.
201. The exact response rate was 48.8%, equivalent to 488 responses. For the
full statistical analysis of the results of the survey, see infra Appendix B.
202. See infra notes 204-37 and accompanying text.
203. See infra notes 238-79 and accompanying text.
204. For the complete statistical breakdown of the responses to question one,
see infra Appendix B. The percentages stated herein are rounded off to the nearest
whole number.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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campaign funds. ' 20 7 A total of seventy percent of the judges who
responded to this question revealed that they are in general agreement
with the model provision.20 1
2. Question 2: "Do you believe a judicial candidate should be
permitted to personally accept campaign contributions for his/her
own election campaign?"
Canon 7B(2) of the CJC also prohibits a candidate from accepting
campaign contributions. 20 9 Fewer judges felt that acceptance of con-
tributions is inappropriate, in comparison to the percentage that
found personally soliciting campaign funds unacceptable. 210 Thirty-
three percent of the judges who responded to this question felt that
personally accepting campaign contributions is definitely inappro-
priate behavior, whereas, forty-four percent of those responding
stated that personally soliciting campaign contributions is definitely
inappropriate behavior .21 Thirty-eight percent of the judges respond-
ing to question two stated that personally accepting campaign con-
tributions is appropriate behavior, in degrees varying from six percent
stating that the behavior is definitely appropriate, eleven percent
stating that the behavior is generally appropriate, to twenty-one
percent believing that the behavior is generally appropriate, but that
there are exceptions. 2
It is apparent from the responses to questions one and two that
a large percentage of the judges questioned are in general agreement
with the CJC prohibitions against a candidate personally soliciting
and accepting campaign funds, as presently set out in Canon 7B(2). 13
Curiously, ten percent more of the judges found personally soliciting
207. For a discussion of this prohibition, see supra notes 16, 30-43 and accom-
panying text.
208. See infra Appendix B.
209. In the same sentence as it prohibits solicitation of campaign contributions,
Canon 7B(2) states, in pertinent part: "a candidate . . . should not himself solicit
or accept campaign funds . . . ." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
7B(2) (1972). For a discussion of this prohibition, see supra notes 30-43 and
accompanying text.
210. Sixty-two percent of the judges stated that the acceptance of campaign
contributions by a candidate is inappropriate behavior, while 70% of the judges
deemed solicitation of contributions unacceptable. For the full statistical analysis
of the results of question two, see infra Appendix B.
211. For the full statistical analysis of the results of the survey, see infra Appendix
B.
212. Id.
213. See supra note 16 and accompanying text for a discussion of the prohibition.
It should also be noted that it is difficult to determine the impact of the large
percentage of respondents who opted for the generally appropriate or generally
inappropriate responses which provided space for the respondent to state exceptions,
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campaign contributions to be inappropriate behavior than did those
who found personally accepting campaign contributions to be in-
appropriate behavior." 4
3. Question 3: "Do you believe a judicial candidate should be
permitted to establish a committee to secure funds for his/her
own election campaign?"
Eighty-eight percent of the judges responding to question three
felt that it is appropriate behavior for a judicial candidate to be
permitted to establish a committee to solicit funds for the candidate's
campaign.215 Forty-two percent of these respondents stated that they
felt the behavior is definitely appropriate, whereas, only seven percent
of the judges felt that the behavior is definitely inappropriate.216
The CJC recommends the creation of such a campaign committee,
stating: "[the candidate] may establish committees of responsible
persons to secure ... funds for his campaign . ".. 27 It follows
that since a large percentage of judges responded that they believe
direct solicitation of campaign contributions by a judicial candidate
is inappropriate behavior,"' many of the judges responding to ques-
tion three would believe that it is appropriate for a candidate to
form a committee to perform those functions that he may not do
himself.
4. Question 4: "Do you believe a judicial candidate should be
permitted to establish a committee to manage his/her own
campaign funds for his/her own election campaign?"
Canon 7B(2) also permits a judicial candidate to "establish com-
mittees of responsible persons to ... manage the expenditure of
funds for his campaign .... ,,219 Only nine percent of the judges
as very few of the judges actually stated what they felt the permissible or imper-
missible exceptions would be. The few judges who did provide examples of specific
exceptions to questions one and two generally stated that it would be permissible
for a candidate to accept or solicit contributions from members of the candidates'
families. Only five judges set forth exceptions to questions one and two, out of
a total of 29% of the responses to question one and 36% of the responses to
question two which requested specification of exceptions. See infra Appendix B,
for the full statistical analysis of the results of the survey.
214. See infra Appendix B.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(2) (1972). For a discussion
of this provision, see supra note 16 and accompanying text and notes 44-54 and
accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 204-08 and accompanying text.
219. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(2) (1972).
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responding to this question felt that permitting a committee to
manage a candidate's campaign funds is inappropriate behavior.2 0
Forty-five percent of the respondents stated that the establishment
of a committee to manage the funds of a judicial candidate is
definitely appropriate behavior, while only six percent of the judges
felt that the behavior is definitely inappropriate. 221
The judges who responded to the survey had stronger reactions
to this question than they did to question three, regarding the
appropriateness of permitting the candidate's committee to secure
the funds. 222 Under the CJC, the candidate is not permitted to
engage in either of these activities directly, and it is the function
of the committee to accomplish for the candidate any of these
campaigning activities. 23 Even though a majority of the respondents
to questions one and two stated that soliciting or accepting campaign
contributions by the judicial candidate is inappropriate behavior, it
is significant that an overwhelming percentage of the judges felt
that it is permissible for the candidate to establish a committee to
solicit and manage the candidate's campaign funds. It is apparent
from the resillts of the survey that a majority of the judges who
responded are in general agreement with the prohibitions and the
recommendations of Canon 7B(2) as they are presently set out in
the CJC. However, many more of the judges felt that there are
exceptions to what type of behavior will or will not be tolerated
when the issue is solicitation or acceptance of campaign funds directly
by the candidate, as opposed to when the issue is the formation of
a committee to secure and manage the campaign funds.22 4
220. See infra Appendix B for the the full statistical analysis of the results of
the survey.
221. Id.
222. Ninety-one percent of the judges were in favor of establishing the committee
to manage the funds and 87.70o of the judges were in favor of establishing the
committee to secure the funds. See infra Appendix B.
223. For a discussion of the role of the campaign committee, see supra notes
44-54 and accompanying text.
224. Twenty-nine percent of the judges responding to question one felt that there
are exceptions to direct solicitation by the candidate being appropriate (15.1%) or
inappropriate (14.2%) behavior; 36.7% of the judges responding to question two
felt that there are exceptions to direct acceptance by the candidate being appropriate(20.807o) or inappropriate (15.9%) behavior. By contrast, only 17.30%o of the judges
responding to question three felt that there are exceptions to allowing the candidate
to establish a committee to secure funds being appropriate (14.0%) or inappropriate
(3.3%) behavior and only 16.6076 of the judges responding to question four felt
that there are exceptions to allowing the candidate to establish a committee to
manage funds being appropriate (14.8%) or inappropriate (1.8%) behavior. See
infra Appendix B.
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5. Question 5: "Do you believe a judicial candidate should be
permitted to attend a fund raiser on his/her own behalf?"
Almost three-quarters of the judges that responded to this question
felt that it is appropriate behavior for a judicial candidate to attend
his own fund raiser.225 This question is the only one in the survey
that was not drafted in the exact words of the campaign conduct
provision of the CJC. 26 The CJC makes no direct reference to this
type of activity, but Canon 7B(2) does prohibit the candidate from
learning the names of the contributors to his campaign unless state
law requires that the list of contributors be filed .22 Therefore, if a
candidate attends a fund raiser held on his behalf where he has
been involved in any way with the planning of the event, or if any
portion of the admission price to the event is to go to his campaign,
he will be in violation of the CJC.22 Nevertheless, seventy-four
percent of the judges who responded to this question felt that
attending a fund raiser is appropriate behavior for a judicial can-
didate.2 29
Several of the judges did respond that they felt the behavior to
be appropriate, but that there are exceptions to what should be
tolerated as generally acceptable behavior. As one judge stated, "I
see nothing wrong with a fund raiser being held for a judicial
candidate provided that his only participation is his appearance
thereat." 230 Another judge felt that attendance at a fund raiser is
permissible so long as the candidate does not ask for funds when
he is in attendance. The goals of the CJC are to maintain the
independence and integrity of the judiciary. 231 Several of the judges
who responded to this question with detailed exceptions voiced con-
cern with respect to these aims of the CJC. One judge stated that he
felt that attendance at a fund raiser is generally appropriate behavior
"except where it would reflect adversely on the image of impartiality
225. See infra Appendix B for the full statistical analysis of the results of the
survey.
226. For the full text of Canon 7B(2), see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
227. Id.
228. For a discussion of a candidate's attendance at a fund raising event, see
supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
229. See infra Appendix B for the full statistical analysis of the results of the
survey.
230. Because the survey was conducted anonymously, it is both impossible and
undesirable to reveal the sources of the comments that will be quoted throughout
Section IV.
231. For a discussion of the aims of the Code of Judicial Conduct, see supra
note 12 and accompanying text.
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of the judge." In summary, although a technical reading of the
campaign conduct provision suggests that attendance by a judicial
candidate at a fund raiser held on his behalf is a violation, a large
majority of judges surveyed clearly would prefer a more permissive
interpretation. 232
6. Question 6: "Do you believe a judicial candidate should be
permitted to know the names of the individuals who provide
campaign funds for his/her own election campaign?"
The commentary that follows Canon 7B(2) of the CJC states:
"Unless the candidate is required by law to file a list of his campaign
contributors, their names should not be revealed to the candidate." '
The judges who responded to this question were almost evenly divided
as to whether this behavior is appropriate or inappropriate for a
judicial candidate. Fifty-four percent of the respondents expressed
the feeling that it is acceptable behavior for a judicial candidate to
learn the names of the contributors to his campaign, and forty-six
percent of the judges responded that such behavior is inappropriate.234
Twenty-three percent of the judges felt that the behavior is definitely
inappropriate, while twenty-two percent of the judges felt that the
behavior is definitely appropriate. 235 After responding that he felt
the behavior is definitely appropriate, one judge stated: "I do not
think the judicial candidate should be permitted to make promises
or commitments in exchange for contributions. I do not think know-
ing the identity of contributors imputes special or favorable treat-
ment." On the other hand, one judge who felt that the behavior
is definitely inappropriate suggested that his supporters would' not
have contributed to his campaign had they been aware that he was
forbidden from learning their names. To further exemplify the judges'
conflicting views, a third judge stated that he felt that the behavior
is generally inappropriate, but presently unavoidable.
The responses to question six are irreconcilable with the responses
to question five.2 16 It is often the case that where a candidate attends
232. See infra Appendix B for the full statistical analysis of the results of the
survey.
233. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(2) commentary (1972).
234. See infra Appendix B for the full statistical analysis of the results of the
survey.
235. Id.
236. There is more than a twenty percentage point differential between the same
responses to each question. See infra Appendix B for the full statistical analysis
of the results of the survey.
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a fund raiser on his behalf, he will learn the names of the individuals
who will contribute or already have contributed funds to his campaign.
While twenty-six percent of the respondents felt that attending a fund
raiser is inappropriate behavior, forty-six percent of the respondents
felt that knowing the names of the contributors is inappropriate behavior
for a judicial candidate." ' One judge addressed these disparate results,
commenting that not knowing who contributed to a candidate's cam-
paign "is fiction because pragmatically even though you may not know
who has or how much has been contributed by your appearance [at
a fund raiser] it ... would permit you to favor those who attended."
The responses to the six multiple choice questions have raised
issues that are not effectively addressed by the CJC. If a judicial
candidate attends a fund raiser on his own behalf, can he possibly
do so without learning the names of those who contribute to his
campaign, or without falling within the prohibition against personally
soliciting contributions? Canon 7B(2) of the CJC attempts to alleviate
some of the tensions created when one must run for judicial office.
Clearly, it falls short of its goals.
C. Results of the Survey-The Essay Question
Additional comments and suggestions were provided in the essay
question by fifty-three percent of the judges who responded to the
survey. 28 The responses covered a wide spectrum of opinions, ranging
from the desire to abolish the elective system altogether, 23 9 to the
belief that the system, as it now stands, requiring the appointment
of committees to solicit and manage a candidate's campaign con-
tributions, is too restrictive and that the candidate should be allowed
to conduct his campaign in any manner he feels appropriate.2 40 The
judges who expressed dissatisfaction with the elective process em-
phasized three different, yet related themes. A number of the judges
expressed disapproval of the subjection of judicial candidates to the
political arena, while others stressed the irreconcilable dichotomy
237. Id.
238. A total of 256 judges completed the essay question.
239. After having responded that he believed that all of the activities discussed
in the multiple choice questions were definitely inappropriate behavior for a judicial
candidate, one judge stated: "I simply believe that election of judges is wholly
and definitely inappropriate. Period."
240. One judge stated: "If society is going to insist on electing judges, then as
candidates they must be free to engage in the elective process. It is hypocrisy to
attempt to isolate the candidate from the fundraising necessary to carry on a
campaign."
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between judicial ethics and the elective process.24' In addition, several
of the judges expressed total dissatisfaction with the election process
and suggested proposals for reform.
Most of the judges asked to participate in the survey were can-
didates at one time in an election contest, either on a partisan or
nonpartisan basis.2 42 Predominantly, the judges who were required
to run on a partisan ticket expressed dislike for the political aspects
of judicial elections.2 43 One judge expressed his anger at being forced
into the "political arena" to become a "political beast." He added
that the only way to avoid playing the "game" is to "take the
judiciary out of politics." Several of the judges also expressed the
view that as long as they are required to run for election to judicial
office, they should not be held to higher ethical standards than
federal legislators.244
The sentiment that "there is a definite conflict in running a political
campaign and trying to be non-political," parallels the view expressed
by many of the judges that elections and judicial ethics are virtually
irreconcilable. One judge asserted that "[tihe elective process and
unbiased judges are mutually exclusive." Another judge found that
it is inevitable that a candidate for judicial office will "break all
the rules.''2
45
Several judges, in addition to expressing their views on the political
and ethical dilemmas of campaigning for judicial office, suggested
several options for reform. For example, a large percentage of judges
who expressed dissatisfaction with the present election process sug-
gested that judges, at all levels, should be chosen by some form of
241. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text for a discussion of this conflict.
242. See supra notes 88-104 and accompanying text for a discussion of the elective
system adopted by each state.
243. After having participated in his first contested election, one judge stated:
I can frankly say that partisan judicial elections are entirely distasteful!
You have to run as a member of a political party and attend rallies to
become "known," but the judicial canons make you walk the line. ...
Judges are not highly paid in this state, and election costs mandate some
sort of fund raising.
244. Another judge responded: "money can corrupt ... but that is true of
legislators, and judges."
245. One judge expanded on this notion of being forced to break the rules of
the game:
Fund raising is usually only necessary where the position is elective.
Inevitably the candidate will come to know the identity of at least some
of the contributors. Always this knowledge is in the back of the mind
of the successful candidate. This places a stress on the judge, even those
pure of heart.
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merit system, 21 either initial selection on a merit basis or by initial
appointment and a subsequent merit retention election.2 47 As one
judge stated, "[o]bviously, the whole system of judges having to
run and accept contributions from attorneys and potential case
participants is nothing but a Catch-22 of the most obvious type.
The 'system' is no better than its parts and this part is indefensible;
merit retention would be better." Several judges expressed dissat-
isfaction with any type of elective system and suggested that state
trial level judges be appointed to terms of specified duration with
no additional terms, or simply that they be appointed to life terms.
One judge stated that "[aibsent either lifetime or limited time ap-
pointments, the problems [of campaigning for judicial office] are
probably unsolvable."
Although the majority of respondents who addressed the issue of
judicial selection methods seemed to express a preference for non-
elective systems, there were others who stood firm in their support
for popular elections. For example, one judge wrote: "NOTWITH-
STANDING all of the problems with judicial elections, the process
is a head taller than appointments (federal or state) and the so-
called Missouri Plan or any plan of the half-blood." Similar state-
ments focused on two interrelated themes: that the elective process
is no more political than other selection methods and that judges
should be chosen only by the "people" of their respective juris-
dictions .24
246. Examples of the judges' suggestions include: (i) "I am in favor of judicial
selection commissions, followed by a retention election where the judge runs on
his record, unopposed;" (ii) "It is my personal opinion that judges should be
elected solely on a retention basis. The very nature of campaigning seems to place
a person in an obligatory position;" and (iii) "Merit selection of judges eliminates
these ethical and practical problems."
247. For a discussion of the merit form of selection, see supra notes 97-102 and
accompanying text.
248. Such statements included: (i) "I am a strong believer in the election of the
judiciary. The appointment of judges not only deprives the citizen of his/her right
to choose, but it places this precious right in the hands of either an "elite" group
or executives who will appoint according to their own political philosophy or
personal preference. In order for one to stand for election to the judiciary he must
be able to raise the funds. How this may be accomplished I am not certain but
certain I am that judges should be elected"; (ii) "[Judges] should in the first
instance be elected by the public, not appointed by social status, political contacts
or media control"; (iii) "Merit selection would be best if there was a non-political
way to select-at present, election is the fairest way to select with a periodic
retention vote"; (iv) "I believe judges should be elected and their work reviewed
by the electorate every few years just to remind them of their humility"; and (v)
"Judges should be answerable to the masses rather than the 'politics' of a 'blue
ribbon' committee."
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Regardless of their individual selection preferences, most of the
judges who responded to the essay question recognized the probable
continued existence of judicial elections,2 49 and thus, provided their
thoughts on the conflicts associated with the financing of a judicial
campaign. One of the judges felt that these conflicts are simply
unavoidable,250 while another believed that they would be adequately
resolved by most candidates even in the absence of currently existing
restrictions." 1 Maintaining the appearance of judicial impartiality
was a prime concern of several respondents. One judge who always
ran, and paid for, his own campaign declared: "I am free in every
sense of the word to administer justice in as even handed a fashion
as I know how. My conscience is clear. I have peace of mind and
I am beholden to no man." However, a greater number of those
who responded to the survey emphasized the pressures of political
reality25 2 and, in running their campaigns, "would probably follow
[a] basic tenet of politicians: 'Your first job is to get elected."'
The majority of essay respondents, who discussed whether there
should be partisan or nonpartisan elections for judicial offices,
expressed a preference for nonpartisan elections. 253 With respect to
249. See Emperor's Clothes, supra note 39, at 121. Voter surveys conducted in
New York, Texas and Wisconsin revealed that well over sixty percent of those
polled believe that judges should be elected. See id. at 86-88.
250. He wrote: "Running for judicial office is definitely a difficult task....
Crossing ethical lines is almost inevitable if not unavoidable if success is the ultimate
goal. The gray areas become blurred during the heat of the campaign. Although
serious breaches can be avoided, minor ones create much more discipline and
challenge."
251. Thisrespondent stated: "I am aware of the ethical considerations involved
but believe that most of the persons aspiring for judicial election are honorable
and do not need the many constraints placed upon them. The few others can be
caught and ultimately removed."
252. One respondent wrote: "A judge who is required to run for election is
placed in an untenable position; the standards which a judge should observe are
unworkable for a politician." Along the same lines, another judge maintained that
"lilt is necessary that a judge be elected and inappropriate steps sometimes have
to be taken."
253. One respondent wrote:
The public expects judges to rise above petty politics and render justice,
not decide cases based on their political implications. This puts elected
judges in an awkward position. I wish I could provide a solution-my
only suggestion would be that judges run without a party label being
used, and let the public make their choice without regard to whether
the candidate is a Republican or Democrat. Party philosophy SHOULD
be irrelevant in a judicial position, so the elimination of the label should
not be a problem.
However, one judge did express a strong preference for partisan elections. He said:
The nonpartisan, popular election, judicial selection process robs the
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the impact of partisanship on fund raising, one judge noted that
as a nonpartisan candidate, he has not had a need to solicit funds
or conduct fund raisers. Another individual emphasized that it is
"absolutely necessary" that partisan candidates be able to solicit
funds, noting that he spent over $40,000 in 1982 for election expenses.
However, other survey participants felt that a nonpartisan candidate
may face even greater difficulties in his fund raising efforts. One
respondent stated that in nonpartisan races, candidates are on their
own with respect to fund raising. Another suggested that if political
parties raised and handled a candidate's campaign funds, "[it would
avoid a great amount of embarrassment and the concomitant ethical
considerations."
,In addition to their general thoughts on judicial campaign financing
ethics, the majority of essay respondents provided specific proposals
for a more effective model Canon 7B(2). These proposals fall into
six general categories: 1) self-funding; 2) public financing; 3) un-
restricted fund raising to the extent granted by law to other elected
officials; 4) additional procedures for regulating the conduct of non-
incumbents; 5) public disclosure with subsequent recusal; and 6)
amount limitations on expenditures and contributions.
1. Self-funding
"An obligated candidate becomes an obligated judge," asserted
one respondent who accepted no money, gifts or services during his
three election campaigns. While several of the judges surveyed agreed
that "the only funds used should be the candidate's own", 2 4 many
others pointed out that the considerable expense of a campaign
necessitates additional resources. One essayist summarized, this prob-
lem as follows: "A campaign is very expensive and most judges
take a cut in income in order to serve. If they are not permitted
to have funds raised on their behalf, the only attorneys who could
pursue a judgeship would be those who are independently wealthy."
career judge of most of the individual political clout he or she might
have had at one time. This becomes apparent when the judge seeks
higher judicial office. If we must run for office, we should be allowed
to participate in party process.
254. Comments included: (i) "I simply am opposed to acquiring campaign funds
from others, under any circumstances. In my humble opinion, the receipt of such
funds from others will serve to ruin our independent judiciary"; and (ii) "In the
first place, judges should not be elected. But, since we are, the candidate should
handle his own campaign and funds. The only funds used should be the candidate's
own. Anything else is bound to cause conflicts."
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Another disagreed, maintaining that "an attorney should be able to
finance his own campaign as a result of his successful practice."
However, it is clear that self-funding, while creating the strongest
appearance of impartiality, is an impractical financing device for
most attorneys seeking an elective judicial office.255
2. Public Funding
A small number of survey participants suggested that public fi-
nancing would virtually eliminate the conflicts currently associated
with judicial campaigns. It would provide candidates with a finan-
cially effective means of achieving an appearance of judicial im-
partiality. Specifically, it "would ensure a modicum of equality,
prevent candidates" feeling obligated to donors, and open the door
to less affluent candidates."
Unfortuately, few respondents provided concrete suggestions for
the implementation of a public financing plan. One judge wrote
that in his state taxpayers contribute to a state campaign fund that
is made available to state senate and representative candidates. He
felt that "these monies should be used for nonpartisan ...judicial
elections, rather than [for] political partisan candidates, with judicial
races having a limit as to total expenditures, with no contributions
being allowed. 256 As a variation on public funding, another re-
spondent suggested that a "bar group could be formed to raise
anonymous funds for deserving judicial candidates."
3. Unrestricted Fund Raising
An overwhelming number of the essayists felt that "as long as
judges are elected, they should be treated as any other political
candidates." '257 One judge asked: "Although we don't accept con-
tributions from those with matters pending, should our standards
255. One respondent noted that a race for judicial office is just as expensive as
other political races and could cost as much as $100,000. For a discussion of the
actual amounts spent on various recent judicial campaigns, see Emperor's Clothes,
supra note 39, at 59-60.
256. For a discussion of expenditure and contribution limitations, see infra notes
276-79 and accompanying text.
257. Such comments were repeated several times: (i) "Ideally, judges should be
uninvolved with politics, but if they are to be subjected to the political process in
their selection and in the retention of their office, it is unfair to tie the judge's
hands behind his back at election time"; (ii) "As long as judges are elected by
the voters, then they are in politics and should be allowed to campaign as any
other political candidate. Since money is [the] life of any political campaign and
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be higher (as they are) than our U.S. elected officials who accept
money and vote on special interest matters pending?" Another re-
spondent suggested that judges not only should, but regularly do,
participate in the political process to the fullest extent permitted by
election law." 8
While some of the respondents seemed to believe that the problems
of funding a judicial campaign simply outweigh the risks and ap-
pearances of judicial partiality,159 others felt that the impartiality of
the bench would not be compromised in any event in the absence
of fund raising restrictions.2 60 Indeed, one judge believed that "[tlhe
best safeguards for the judiciary are found in the minds and hearts
of honest, ethical, independent candidates, not in unenforceable
statutes and regulations."
One respondent suggested that, given the fact that judicial can-
didates currently are held to higher standards than other political
candidates, "[t]he bar (state and/or national) should underwrite
printed materials that can be used to educate the voter on campaign
restrictions unique to judicial offices." He noted that "voters expect
that any candidates for any office will campaign [and] do not
differentiate between judicial offices and other offices as-to what
politician, the judges should be allowed to raise money for political campaigns just
as any other office seeker. The only other alternative is to appoint judges for
life"; (iii) "I am not sure that judges should be elected but as long as they are,
they are candidates just as any other politician. It is therefore necessary to raise
money to campaign-there is no other way"; and (iv) "If the system provides for
a judge to run for office, then it should provide a way to raise funds."
258. He wrote:
It is unfortunate that judges are forced into the political arena and in
order to get elected, they are forced to play the game like everyone else.
If they do otherwise, they will not be elected. So long as we are forced
into politics, we will do as others do in that regard.
259. One judge wrote:
While a complete divorce of the candidates for judicial office from a
campaign and the money it takes to run a campaign may be ideal, it
will have as its only effect the electing of wealthy judges. A balancing
of the "goods" leads me to believe a judicial candidate must be allowed
to raise money for the campaign.
For related statements, see supra note 252.
260. One judge wrote: "A judicial candidate must secure funds to run a campaign
just like any other elected official. I do not feel fund raising will affect adversely
judicial ethics post campaign." Another respondent commented:
With respect to the conflict created by accepting a campaign contribution
from an individual, I see less of a conflict in accepting a $100 cash gift
than in allowing people to get wrapped up in one's campaign activities.
I could be much more impartial in making a decision involving someone
who has contributed money than someone who has contributed hours
of their time.
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campaign behavior is or is not appropriate." However, education
of the public is unlikely to satisfy those judges who felt that there
should be no such differentiation in campaign behavior.
4. Regulation of Non-incumbents
Some survey participants stated that all candidates for judicial
office, incumbents and non-incumbents alike, should be held to
identical campaign fund raising standards. 26' Since Canon 7B(2) at
the present time does apply to all candidates for judicial office, 262
the unstated concern of some respondents may be that, as one judge
explained, "usually an opponent does not feel bound by the ethical
standards that bind judges." Violations are thus more likely to be
committed by an, incumbent's opponents than by the incumbent
himself, according to some of the respondents. One judge suggested
that the public should be made aware of the differences not only
between candidates for judicial office and candidates for other of-
fices, 263 but also between incumbents and other candidates for judicial
office.
One judge maintained that it is the lack of a procedure for
sanctioning non-incumbents who violate the'CJC that accounts for
such candidates' lack of incentive to adhere to the spirit or intent
of the CJC. He related one case where an incumbent, who had
served for sixteen years, filed a grievance against his successful
challenger for violating the CJC, but ultimately found that there
was no forum to redress the wrong. The respondent suggested:
"Either strike the candidate who violates the [CJC] from the ballot
or let all candidates run a no-holds barred campaign. ' ' 264 However,
he did not specify a possible forum in which the parties could be
heard, and made no mention of the role state bar associations might
play in the enforcement of Canon 7B(2) against non-incumbents. 265 .
261. Statements included: (i) "Ethically, it would be better to not have to solicit
funds. However, as long as elections are being waged, you cannot hold the judge
to a different standard regarding raising campaign funds than their opponents";
(ii) "I do not think it is fair to take every means from a judge to defend his job
when there are no holds barred on those who wish to take his job from him"; and
(iii) "I feel that the judicial ethics judges must live by when seeking re-election
should also apply to their opposition."
262. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 257-60 and accompanying text.
264. For suggestions related to unrestricted campaign financing, see supra notes
257-60 and accompanying text.
265. For a discussion of the enforcement of Canon 71(2) against non-incumbents,
see supra notes 179-90 and accompanying text.
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It should be noted that not all of those who participated in the
essay question felt that sitting judges are at a disadvantage in running
their judicial campaigns. One judge wrote: "Running for judicial
office is definitely a difficult task, particularly challenging an in-
cumbent." Another respondent commented that while on the one
hand, non-incumbents are less restricted in running their judicial
campaigns, 266 on the other hand, "there is subtle pressure put upon
members of the bar by judges not to make campaign races against
other judges."2 67
5- Public Disclosure/Recusal
Many of the essay respondents believed that it is appropriate for
a judicial candidate to know the names of those who have contributed
to his campaign.2 68 One respondent wrote that he did not "believe
that campaign contributions are ever so large as to get favors from
the judge just because the judge knows who contributes," and
another found that most contributors do not expect such favors.2 69
However, another judge viewed the situation differently: "Most of
my money was contributed by my parents or myself. I very much
appreciated the contributions I received from others. However, it
makes me feel uncomfortable dealing with them in court. Perhaps
it would be better if we didn't know where the contributions came
266. He stated:
I feel that it is unfair for a sitting judge to be bound by many campaign
restrictions but yet have an opponent who has ample time to accumulate
resources and political support without restrictions. Example: suppose
the county political party chairman of long standing decides to run
against a sitting judge.
267. Indeed, according to another judge, it is the bar association, rather than
standardized campaign guidelines, that should protect a judicial incumbent. He
wrote: "Good judges seldom have opposition and if they do, the bar association
should rally to their support."
268. Fifty-four percent of all survey respondents believe that a judicial candidate
should be permitted to know the names of individuals who contribute funds to
his election campaign. See supra notes 233-37 and accompanying text for an analysis
of this result.
269. The latter respondent wrote:
My experience has been that persons who make campaign contributions
do so because of friendship or concern for competence and impartiality
in the judiciary and NOT in any effort to influence the outcome of any
particular case in which they may be involved. If a judicial candidate
should suspect that a contribution is tendered for the latter reason, it
should be refused or returned with a polite explanation that it would
not be proper for the candidate to accept a contribution from someone
who has pending litigation or problems that may lead to litigation because
of the possibility of the appearance of impropriety.
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from." 270 Nevertheless, there were several respondents who believed
that judicial candidates not only should, but must, know who has
contributed to their campaigns.
Most of these judges felt that they should be prepared to recuse
themselves from cases in which contributors appear. 7 ' In addition,
others believed that it is necessary so that they may refuse contri-
butions from inappropriate sources. '
According to many of the respondents, in order to avoid the
appearance of judicial partiality, disclosure should be made both to
the candidates and the public. 273 One respondent makes it his practice
to tell the lawyer on the other side when a person involved in a
case has contributed financially to his campaign. He noted: "If he
or his client requests, I will then disqualify myself. Usually they
don't, perhaps thinking I'll bend over backwards to the other side,
which perhaps sub-consciously I might." Another respondent believed
that in order to avoid improprieties, a judge need only disqualify
himself from cases in which generous contributors appear. Campaign
managers, treasurers and members of their law firms should not be
allowed to appear in front of their candidate for a number of years,
according to another respondent.
Although public disclosure and subsequent recusal would be un-
necessary where a judge remains unaware of who has contributed
to his campaign, one respondent noted that "if the judge is going
to base his decisions on who provided campaign funds, that judge
will make a point of finding out who provided funds, whether it
is permitted or not." Thus, perhaps it would be better to require,
as another judge suggested, "the full reporting of all campaign
270. Another respondent wrote: "Perhaps it would be all right to know of non-
lawyers who contribute, but not lawyers."
271. One respondent wrote: "I am required to run for office. I need to know
who contributed to my campaign so that I can immediately disqualify [myself] if
they are involved in litigation."
272. One judge wrote: "I believe a judge should know who contributes to his
campaign so that the judge can refuse any contributions from a doubtful source."
See also supra note 269.
273. One judge proposed:
The judge and the public should know the names of contributors for
the protection of the litigants who, with access to that information, could
question the propriety of a judge sitting on a case wherein a contributor
is a party, and for the protection of the judge who, with access to that
information, could legitimately recuse himself from the case.
Some respondents noted that they are required by law to file a list of all contributors
to their election campaigns. For a discussion of disclosure requirements in the
various states, see supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
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contribtions," which would permit "anyone to challenge the judge
for favoritism." It would follow that the judge should also know
who has contributed to his campaign so that he may disqualify
himself where necessary and, thus, protect himself from charges of
partiality. However, another respondent cautioned that, particularly
in a small rural community, recusal is not always a feasible solution
to the problem of the appearance of judicial partiality.27 4
One judge suggested that, provided a judicial candidate's actions
are fully and publicly disclosed, he may even solicit and accept
funds on his own behalf without risking any appearance of impro-
priety.275 However, other essay respondents would limit their solic-
itation to relatives and close friends and would not accept contributions
from attorneys or from anyone with pending charges. Furthermore,
these individuals would recuse themselves from subsequent cases in
which their contributors might appear.
6. Amount Limitations on Expenditures and Contributions
Several survey participants recommended that a limit should be
set on the amount of both the expenditures and the contributions
allowed for a judicial campaign. The limit should ensure that con-
tributions are "not only free from 'buying' a judge, but also have
no appearance of 'purchase.' " Another judge believed that an in-
dividual contribution of $300 to $500 would be within the appropriate
limit. One respondent voluntarily set limits on contributions to his
local and state-wide races of $50 and $100, respectively. 276
274. He explained:
I am a judge in a county of 12,XXX people. I hear a number of cases
involving people who are distantly related, as well as aquaintances. Judges
from a metropolitan area would probably disqualify themselves under
the same circumstances where I might hear a case. Most other judges
from rural [areas] that I talk to do the same as I do. We bail out only
where a party is a good friend or close relative. To some not from a
rural area, this may seem bad. The real justification in my mind is that
everyone knows everyone else's business in a small community. If what
I am doing would be perceived as improper, I would not be the judge
for long. Ultimately, the people are the judges of my performance and
that is the way I think it should be.
275. However, only about thirty percent of all survey participants responded that
it is appropriate for a candidate for judicial office to personally solicit funds and
only thirty-eight percent of the respondents believed that it is appropriate for a
candidate to personally accept campaign contributions. See supra notes 204-14 and
accompanying text for an analysis of these results.
276. Another stated that contributions generally range from $10 to $500. For a
discussion of contribution limitations currently established in the various states, see
Emperor's Clothes, supra note 39, at 95, 125-26.
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One judge stated that "there must be some constitutionally sound
scheme adopted and implemented to limit campaign expenses." In-
deed, while the Supreme Court has upheld contribution ceilings,2 7
it has held campaign expenditure limitations unconstitutional under
the First Amendment.2 7 However, if a candidate is receiving public
funds, limitations may be placed upon the amount of his campaign
spending. 279
V. Proposal
The goal of the drafters of Canon 7B(2) of the CJC was to guide
candidates for judicial office to a resolution of the conflict between
the candidate's need to fund his campaign and the requirement that
he maintain an appearance of impartiality and independence. 20 This
objective has not been achieved by the present CJC Canon 7B(2).
It is clear from the results of the survey28 and the variant approaches
taken by several states, 2 2 that Canon 7B(2) of the. CJC does not
effectively regulate the financing of judicial campaigns. 23 It is time
for the ABA to reevaluate Canon 7B(2) and to adopt a provision
that will incorporate the suggestions raised herein. The proposal that
follows is an attempt to address and resolve the issues and concerns
raised by the respondents to the survey.28 4
7B(2) FUND RAISING CONDUCT
A candidate for election to, retention in, or re-election to judicial
office should conduct his campaign in a manner consistent with
the requirements of Canon 1, to uphold the integrity and inde-
pendence of the judiciary. A candidate should not personally
277. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-35 (1975). The Court stated that limiting
both the actuality and the appearance of corruption is a constitutionally sufficient
justification for a $1000 contribution limitation. However, the Court also recognized
that "[u]nder a system of private financing of elections, a candidate lacking immense
personal or family wealth must depend on financial contributions from others to
provide the resources necessary to conduct a successful campaign." Id. at 26.
278. Id. at 58. The Court stated that "expenditure ceilings impose direct and
substantial restraints on the quantity of political speech." Id. at 39. They restrict
"the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of
the audience reached." Id. at 19.
279. Id. at 57 n.65.
280. See REPORTER'S NOTES, supra note 7, at 98-99.
281. See supra Section IV.
282. See supra Section 1II.
283. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 238-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of the results
of the survey.
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solicit or accept campaign contributions. Unless his campaign is
to be financed solely with personal funds or funds donated from
the immediate members of his family, a candidate should establish
a committee of responsible persons to secure and manage the
expenditure of funds for his campaign. A candidate should refer
all prospective contributors to his campaign committee. A can-
didate is not prohibited from attending fund raisers on his own
behalf, provided that during his attendance thereat he makes no
direct appeals for contributions to his campaign.
A candidate's committee is not prohibited from soliciting cam-
paign contributions from lawyers. However, such committee should
not solicit or accept contributions from attorneys or litigants with
cases pending before the candidate or the court in which the
candidate would sit upon election to judicial office. In the event
that a contributor should appear before a judge after his election,
the judge should make that fact known to all parties involved in
the litigation, and, at the request of any party, disqualify himself
from the case, if, in his discretion, he believes that his disqual-
ification would not prejudice the rights of any other party. A
candidate for judicial office shall comply with all applicable pro-
visions of the state's election law, as stated at [ 1.
[Each state shall set forth the name and authority of the judicial
commission that will have jurisdiction to police and enforce the
above provision.]
The proposal set forth above differs substantially from Canon
7B(2) of the CJC. It incorporates the views of .the judges surveyed
and the modifications and variations adopted in several of the states.
As indicated by its title, the proposed Canon relates solely to fund
raising conduct. The CJC's provisions concerning the solicitation
and acceptance of publicly stated support may raise additional issues
that were not addressed in this Note, and thus, those provisions
have been eliminated from the proposal.2 15 In addition, 7B(3) has
been eliminated and incorporated into 7B(2). Thus, subdivision (2)
applies to all candidates, including an incumbent judge who is running
unopposed for retention in, or re-election to, office.
Proposed Canon 7B(2) includes a reminder to all candidates that
upholding the integrity and independence of the judiciary is their
prime responsibility. It has become increasingly apparent that election
campaigns require a significant amount of money.2 6 Therefore, as
long as any state requires the election of any of its judges, it is
285. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
286. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1985, at B6, col. 1.
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imperative that the candidates are made fully aware of their social
and ethical responsibilities. The proposed canon stresses. the goals
of the CJC, while easing some of the tensions that arise when a
candidate must raise' funds for his election campaign.287
Several ethics opinions have provided that a candidate is free to
use his own funds and funds contributed by the immediate members
of his family. 288 The proposed canon specifically provides that this
behavior is acceptable, alleviating any confusion that may arise during
a campaign.28 9
Proposed Canon 7B(2) retains the CJC's provision that a candidate
should not personally solicit or accept campaign contributions. Sev-
eral states have amended Canon 7B(2) to allow a candidate to accept
contributions. 290 Although the proposed canon prohibits a candidate
from personally accepting contributions,2 91 it does not require a
candidate to turn away prospective contributors. Rather, it provides
that should a candidate be approached by a prospective supporter,
he should refer that person to his campaign committee. A candidate
should not feel he is violating any ethical code should an unsolicited
contributor approach him. 292
The most significant change in proposed Canon 7B(2) is the
statement that a candidate is not prohibited from attending a fund
raiser held on his own behalf. Under the CJC, attendance at such
an activity would result in a technical violation of Canon 7B(2). 293
However, seventy-five percent of the judges who responded to the
survey felt that attendance at such a fund raising activity is appro-
priate behavior for a judicial candidate.2 94 Clearly, Canon 7B(2) does
287. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text for a discussion of these tensions.
288. See supra note 49 and accompanying text for a discussion of these opinions.
289. It should be noted that several of the judges who responded to the essay
question felt that self-funding is the only way to run a completely independent
and impartial campaign. As this would effectively exclude the great majority of
candidates, the proposed canon suggests that there will be no violation of the Code
of Judicial Conduct if the candidate should choose to use some of his own or his
family's money, but does not restrict the candidate to this type of campaign funding.
See supra notes 254-55.
290. For a discussion of the amendments adopted by several states, see supra
notes 105-55 and accompanying text.
291. Sixty-three percent of the judges who responded to the survey felt that
personally accepting campaign contributions is inappropriate behavior. See infra
Appendix B for the full statistical analysis of the results of the survey.
292. For a discussion of the elimination of the Commentary, which states that
a candidate should not know the names of the contributors to his campaign, see
infra note 297-99 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 225-32 and accompanying text.
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not adequately address the current needs of election campaigns. The
proposed canon more accurately responds to the ethical as well as
the financial demands of judicial campaigns. As long as the candidate
does not engage in the direct solicitation of funds at a fund raiser,
attendance at the event is well within the acceptable boundaries of
the CJC.
Proposed Canon 7B(2) also qualifies the propriety of allowing a
candidate's committee to solicit contributions from attorneys. Several
of the judges who responded to the essay question of the survey
voiced concern about the possibility of contributors appearing before
the candidate once he has been elected.2 9 The proposed canon
attempts to alleviate this dilemma in three ways. First, the proposal
prohibits the candidate's committee from soliciting or accepting funds
from current litigants. Second, it provides that in the event a con-
tributor should appear before the judge, the judge should disqualify
himself if any party so requests, provided that no other party would
be prejudiced by his resignation from the case. Finally, the proposal
deletes the commentary of Canon 7B(2), requiring that the names
of contributors not be revealed to the candidate.
Since the solicitation and acceptance of contributions from current
litigants excludes any possibility of the appearance of judicial im-
partiality, such conduct is expressly forbidden by the proposed Canon
7B(2). Furthermore, the proposal's recommendation that a judge
recuse himself from a case in which a contributor appears is an
attempt to establish the fairest and most equitable course of action
by requiring that the judge determine whether the rights of any
party would be prejudiced by his recusal. Factors to be considered
include the geographic location of the court and the availability of
other forums in which the parties might be heard. 296
The commentary to Canon 7B(2) has been eliminated for three
reasons. First, a candidate for judicial roffice must know the identity
of his contributors in order to refuse or return contributions from
inappropriate sources and to recuse himself from cases in which his
contributors appear.2 97 Second, the commentary, if retained, would
be inconsistent with the proposed Canon's provision permitting a
candidate to attend a fund raiser on his own behalf.2 98 Finally, the
295. For a discussion of these survey responses, see supra notes 268-75 and
accompanying text.
296. For a discussion of the impracticability of recusal in rural areas, see supra
note 274 and accompanying text.
297. Many of the survey participants felt a need to know the identity of their
contributors for these reasons. See supra notes 268-75 and accompanying text.
298. See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
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commentary has been rendered obsolete by the enactment of laws
in each of the fifty states and the District of Columbia requiring
that a candidate for any elective office file a list of the names of
his campaign contributors. 299
Two final additions have been made in proposed Canon 7B(2).
The proposal deletes any reference to time limitations on soliciting
funds. However, the candidate is instructed to comply with all of
the applicable provisions of his respective state's election laws, in-
cluding any proscriptions on soliciting campaign contributions for
prescribed time periods before and after the election. It is up to
each individual state to direct the candidate to the appropriate
provisions, and to adapt Canon 7B(2) to its judicial selection meth-
ods. Each state has its own method of selection and goals to be
achieved by those methods. 3°° Therefore, each state must set out for
the candidates its particular rules and regulations that have been
implemented to promote its system. The CJC is a model provision
that must be adapted to the needs of each individual state. The
proposed canon also provides that each individual state should set
forth the jurisdictional provision of a committee whose chief re-
sponsibility is to police judicial campaigns and to enforce Canon
7B(2).101 As each state must create its own committee with whatever
powers it deems necessary, the proposal only provides that each
state should set forth the name and the scope of the authority of
such a committee. The existence of these committees should be
disclosed to the candidates and the public before the commencement
of any judicial election campaigns. It is imperative that the can-
didates, as well as the public, be fully informed of the behavior
deemed appropriate and therefore required of a candidate for judicial
office.
VI. Conclusion
Canon 7B(2) of the CJC does not presently set out appropriate
or feasible guidelines for a judicial candidate. This Note recommends
adoption of the proposal set forth above, which incorporates both
the suggestions of a large sampling of elected trial level judges who
responded to the survey and the amendments made to Canon 7B(2)
by several states. Maintaining the integrity and independence of the
299. See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 88-104 and accompanying text for a discussion of the various
selection methods.
301. For a discussion of the need for a committee to adjudicate such matters,
see supra notes 163-90 and accompanying text.
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judiciary is the stated goal of the CJC. °2 This goal can be more
readily achieved by adopting a canon that is a closer reflection of
reality. By allowing the candidate to attend a fund raiser held on
his behalf, or by requiring the successful candidate to recuse himself
in certain situations where a contributor later appears before him,
the candidate is given a freer reign during his election campaign,
without forcing him to compromise his ethical values. A provision
that gives guidance to the candidates, as well as to the public, is
essential for the fair resolution of a problem that plagues judicial
election campaigns.
Leona C. Smoler
Mary A. Stokinger
302. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (1972).
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Appendix A
Survey Re: Judicial Elections
INSTRUCTIONS: Check the space that corresponds to your view
as to the stance the legal profession should take regarding each of
the following election activities if the rules of judicial ethics were
to be changed. Please do not place your name anywhere on the
survey.
1. Do you believe a judicial candidate should be permitted to
personally solicit campaign funds for his/her own election campaign?
- No, I believe the behavior is definitely inappropriate.
- No, I believe the behavior is generally inappropriate.
- No, I believe the behavior is generally inappropriate, but there
are exceptions:
- Yes, I believe the behavior is generally appropriate, but there
are exceptions:
- Yes, I believe the behavior is generally appropriate.
- Yes, I believe the behavior is definitely appropriate.
2. Do you believe a judicial candidate should be permitted to
personally accept campaign contributions for his/her own election
campaign?
- No, I believe the behavior is definitely inappropriate.
- No, I believe the behavior is generally inappropriate.
- No, I believe the behavior is generally inappropriate, but there
are exceptions:
- Yes, I believe the behavior is generally appropriate, but there
are exceptions:
- Yes, I believe the behavior is generally appropriate.
- Yes, I believe the behavior is definitely appropriate.
3. Do you believe a judicial candidate should be permitted to
establish a committee to secure funds for his/her own election
campaign?
- No, I believe the behavior is definitely inappropriate.
- No, I believe the behavior is generally inappropriate.
- No, I believe the behavior is generally inappropriate, but there
are exceptions:
__ Yes, I believe the behavior is generally appropriate, but there
are exceptions:
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- Yes, I believe the behavior is generally appropriate.
- Yes, I believe the behavior is definitely appropriate.
4. Do you believe a judicial candidate should be permitted to
establish a committee to manage his/her own campaign funds for
his/her own election campaign?
- No, I believe the behavior is definitely inappropriate.
- No, I believe the behavior is generally inappropriate.
- No, I believe the behavior is generally inappropriate, but there
are exceptions:
- Yes, I believe the behavior is generally appropriate, but there
are exceptions:
- Yes, I believe the behavior is generally appropriate.
- Yes, I believe the behavior is definitely appropriate.
5. Do you believe a judicial candidate should be permitted to
attend a fund raiser on his/her own behalf?
- No, I believe the behavior is definitely inappropriate.
- No, I believe the behavior is generally inappropriate.
- No, I believe the behavior is generally inappropriate, but there
are exceptions:
- Yes, I believe the behavior is generally appropriate, but there
are exceptions:
- Yes, I believe the behavior is generally appropriate.
- Yes, I believe the behavior is definitely appropriate.
6. Do you believe a judicial candidate should be permitted to
know the names of the individuals who provide campaign funds for
his/her own election campaign?
- No, I believe the behavior is definitely inappropriate.
- No, I believe the behavior is generally inappropriate.
- No, I believe the behavior is generally inappropriate, but there
are exceptions:
- Yes, I believe the behavior is generally appropriate, but there
are exceptions:
- Yes, I believe the behavior is generally appropriate.
- Yes, I believe the behavior is definitely appropriate.
7. Finally, we would appreciate your providing us with any ad-
ditional comments you may have concerning ethics and judicial
campaign conduct, including your own campaign experiences:
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In order to calculate accurate results, we request that you furnish
the state in which you are a judge:-.
THANK YOU FOR COMPLETING THE SURVEY. PLEASE
PLACE IT IN THE ENVELOPE PROVIDED AND RETURN IT
TO US AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
Appendix B
Statistical Analysis of the Results of the Survey
Question 1:
Definitely inappropriate: 43.5%"/o
Generally inappropriate: 12.6%
Generally inappropriate, but there are exceptions: 14.2%
Generally appropriate, but there are exceptions: 15.1076
Generally appropriate: 10.5%
Definitely appropriate: 4.1 07o
Histogram Frequency:
Count Value
211 1.00 *************
61 2.00 *
69 3.00 *********
73 4.00 *
51 5.00 ******
20 6.00 ***
I........ ......... I.......I ....... I.....I
0 80 160 240 320 400
One symbol equals approximately 8.00 occurrences
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Question 2:
Definitely inappropriate: 32.6%
Generally inappropriate: 13.407o
Generally inappropriate, but there are exceptions: 15.9%
Generally appropriate, but there are exceptions: 20.8%
Generally appropriate: 11.3%
Definitely appropriate: 6.0%
Histogram Frequency:
Count Value
158 1.00 ****************************************
65 2.00 ********
77 3.00**********
101 4.00*************
55 5.00 *******
29 6.00****
I ........ I......I ........ I ....... I......I
0 40 80 120 160 200
One symbol equals approximately 4.00 occurrences
Question 3:
Definitely inappropriate: 7.2%Wo
Generally inappropriate: 1.9%
Generally inappropriate, but there are exceptions: 3.3%
Generally appropriate, but there are exceptions: 14.0%
Generally appropriate: 31.707o
Definitely appropriate: 42.0%
Histogram Frequency:
Count Value
35 1.00***
9 2.00 *
16 3.00 **
68 4.00 *********
154 5.00 *
204 6.00 *
I ........ I...... ........ ........ I....... I
0 80 160 240 320 400
One symbol equals approximately 8.00 occurrences
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Question 4:
Definitely inappropriate: 5.7%
Generally inappropriate: 1.2%
Generally inappropriate, but there are exceptions: 1.8%
Generally appropriate, but there are exceptions: 14.8%
Generally appropriate: 31.2%
Definitely appropriate: 45.2076
Histogram Frequency:
Count Value
28 1.00 ****
6 2.00 *
9 3.00 *
72 4.00 *********
152 5.00 *******************
220 6.00 ****************************
I ........ I........ I...... ........ I....... I
0 80 160 240 320 400
One symbol equals approximately 8.00 occurrences
Question 5:
Definitely inappropriate: 13.8%
Generally inappropriate: 6.0%
Generally inappropriate, but there are exceptions: 5.8%
Generally appropriate, but there are exceptions: 16.7%
Generally appropriate: 23.9%
Definitely appropriate: 33.8%
Histogram Frequency:
Count Value
67 1.00 *****************
29 2.00 *******
28 3.00 *
81 4.00 ********************
116 5.00 *****************************
164 6.00 *****************************************
I ........ I........ I...... ........ I....... I
0 80 160 240 320 400
One symbol equals approximately 4.00 occurrences
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Question 6:
Definitely inappropriate:
Generally inappropriate:
Generally inappropriate, but there are exceptions:
Generally appropriate, but there are exceptions:
Generally appropriate:
Definitely appropriate:
23.8%
13.9%
8.3%
10.1%
22.4%
21.5%
Histogram Frequency:
Count
115
67
40
49
108
104
Value
1.00 *****************************
2.00 *****************
3.00 *********
4.00******
5.00**************
6.00 **************************
I........ ........ I........I ....... I....... I
0 40 80 120 160 200
One symbol equals approximately 4.00 occurrences
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